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ABSTRACT 
İşçi, Onur 
M.A. Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Norman Stone 
May 2005 
 
By the summer of 1917, when the dissolution of the Russian defense in 
World War I reached its climax, General L. G. Kornilov was appointed as the 
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.  Kornilov was a passionate 
fighting general with legendary valor, who not only tried to revitalize Russia’s 
combative forces, but also labored to contain a possible Bolshevik insurgence.  
Despite his flaws in diplomatic communication skills and the ultimative language he 
employed, he attracted much support and gradually became the center of liberal–
conservative circles.  Prime Minister Kerensky, however, despised Kornilov and his 
increasing reputation because he obsessively feared a right-wing coup.  This 
conviction together with his reluctance to stand against the Soviet, had led the 
Premier to turn a blind eye on the Bolsheviks’ preparations for the imminent armed 
uprising.  This study will cover the period from July 1917 to September 1917, when 
bilateral affairs between the two camps of dramatis personae gradually exacerbated, 
and will seek to analyze the circumstances under which Kornilov rose against the 
Provisional Government. 
 
   
 iv 
ÖZET 
İşçi, Onur 
Master Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Norman Stone 
Mayıs 2005 
 
 1917 yılının yaz mevsiminde, Rusya’nın Doğu Cephesi savunma hattı 
dağılınca, General L. G. Kornilov Başkomutan olarak atanarak ordunun başına 
getirildi.  Kornilov, cesareti ve 1. Dünya Savaşı öncesindeki hizmetleri ile Geçici 
Hükümetin takdirini kazanmış bir askerdi.  Göreve getirlidiği andan itibaren, 
yalnızca ordunun mukavemetini arttırmak için değil, muhtemel bir Bolşevik 
ayaklanmasını bastırmak için de gerekli tedbirleri almaya çalıştı.  Diplomatik 
usullere olan yabancılığına rağmen, takdire şayan bir destek toplayarak liberal-
muhafazakar çevrelerin odağı haline geldi.  Başbakan Kerenski ise darbenin Bolşevik 
kanadından değil sağdan geleceğini savunarak giderek güçlenen Kornilov 
taraftarlarına karşı ihtiyatlı, ve kimi zaman düşmanca bir politika izledi.  Geçici 
Hükümet liderinin İşçi ve Askerler Sovyet’i ile muhalefetten kaçınması ise Bolşevik 
cephesindeki gelişmelerin gözardı edilmesine sebep oldu.  Bu tez çalışmasında iki 
kamp arasındaki ilişkilerin giderek bozulduğu 1917 yılının Temmuz ve Eylül ayları 
arasındaki dönem incelenerek, General Kornilov’un Geçici Hükümete karşı hangi 
sebeplerden dolayı ayaklandığı açıklanmaya çalışılacaktır.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The repercussions of the Russian revolution, which were to shape the rest of 
20th century world politics, had not been comprehended thoroughly in the year 1917.  
This was partly because the great powers of Europe were concentrated on the most 
devastating war ever conceived by humanity.  The majority of non-Russians 
perceived the revolution as “exclusively local”1, and thought that it could be 
contained after the re-establishment of peace.  On the contrary, however, the 
revolution’s impact had soon transcended local boundaries and changed the course of 
history up today.  Numerous studies on various aspects of this momentous event 
have so far been made by scholars, especially after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.  Indeed, the abrupt death of the Soviet Union made its birth more interesting.  
“The revolution of 1917 has defined the shape of the contemporary world”, as 
Orlando Figes puts it, “and we are only now emerging from its shadow.”2 
 The circumstances that paved the way for a revolution of such significance 
are multifaceted.  Until February 1917, the government in Russia had been led by a 
rigidly autocratic monarchy, which traced its dynasty back to 1613, and which had 
retained its absolutist powers since then.  When the Tsarist regime, which was 
considerably late in emerging from feudalism compared to its European rivals, had 
begun to suffer from financial recession and military defeats a surge of popular 
enthusiasm for democracy emerged.3  The growing resentment of the masses in 
                                                 
1 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution: 1899 – 1919 (New York: Knopf, 1990), p.xxii.  
2 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891 – 1924 (London: Pimlico, 1996), 
p.xvii. 
3 Robert Service, Society and Politics in the Rusisian Revolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1992), p.1. 
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Russia reached unprecedented heights within World War I, and transformed the 
politics, society and economy of Russia.  
 In the aftermath of the February Revolution, governmental power was 
transferred to a provisional body, which was established to correspond to the 
people’s needs while preserving the unity of the Greater Russia.  However, the 
setbacks suffered by the Provisional Government – the April Crisis, the failure of the 
great offensive on the southwestern front, the barely suppressed uprising of the 
Bolsheviks in Petrograd in July, the gradual disintegration of the armed forces, the 
continued friction between the government and the Soviet, and the general unrest in 
the countryside – destroyed the hopes for the realization of the Revolution’s ideals.  
All these problems “profoundly shook the foundations of a government” as W.H. 
Chamberlin puts it, “which had been weak from its birth”.4  
 By the summer of 1917, when the dissolution of the Russian defense reached 
its climax, General Kornilov was appointed as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of 
the Russian Army.  Kornilov was a passionate fighting general with legendary valor, 
who not only tried to revitalize Russia’s combative forces, but also labored to contain 
a possible Bolshevik insurgence.  Despite his flaws in diplomatic communication 
skills and the ultimative language he employed, he attracted much support and 
gradually became the center of liberal–conservative circles.  Prime Minister 
Kerensky, however, despised Kornilov and his increasing reputation because he 
obsessively feared a right-wing coup.  This conviction together with his reluctance to 
stand against the Soviet, had led the Premier to turn a blind eye at the Bolsheviks’ 
preparations for the imminent armed uprising.  Although Kerensky later recalled in 
                                                                                                                                          
actually Russian feudalism was much different than Western Feudalism. (eg. Laws, property rights, 
etc.) 
4 W.H. Chamberlin, ‘The Kornilov Mutiny’, in M.K. Dziewanowski, ed., The Russian Revolution: An 
Anthology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970), p.101. 
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his memoirs that “I feel obliged to say emphatically that I have never doubted his 
(Kornilov’s) love for his country”5, he chose to challenge Kornilov during his term 
of influence (Kornilovshchina) by rejecting his demands for the immediate 
restoration of order at the front. 
 General Kornilov, “despairing of the likelihood of moving the Provisional 
Government to definite action against the Bolsheviks”6, rose against the Government 
and the Bolshevik Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Delegates.  The Generalissimo’s 
failure brought about the catastrophic end of the Provisional Government through 
destroying the prestige of Kerensky both in the eyes of the right-wing and left-wing 
supporters.  Moreover, war weariness, widespread discontent on living conditions, 
and the “alluring catchwords: ‘power to the proletariat and land to the peasantry’” 
were the main causes of the Russians’ indifference or non-resistance to the advent of 
Bolshevism.7  Power, thus, slid away from the hands of the Provisional Government, 
paving the way for Bolshevism.   
 Although the Bolsheviks often claimed that the course of the revolution was 
already delineated before the Kornilov Affair, it certainly gave a great impetus to the 
Bolsheviks’ cause.  Since the emergence of serious new research on the Russian 
Revolution, above all the works of Richard Pipes and Orlando Figes, the crucial 
importance of the Kornilov Affair has come more into focus.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to penetrate into the often confused final episode of the path to Bolshevism 
in Russia. 
 The thesis is divided into three main parts following the introduction.  The 
first chapter, which constitutes the historical background of the Kornilov Affair, 
                                                 
5 A.F.Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Rebellion (London: T. Fischer Unwin 
Ltd.,1919), p.23.     
6 General A.I. Denikin, The White Army (Cambridge: Ian Faulkner Publishing, 1992), p.13. 
7 Ibid., p.15. 
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explores how and why the Provisional Government lost control after February.  For 
purposes of clarity it is divided into two sub-sections, the first of which looks at the 
period prior to the February Revolution of 1917.  It begins with an analysis of the 
impact of World War I on the Russian society and further examines the 
disintegration of the Russian Army at the Eastern Front - the actual cause that led to 
the decline of the old Romanov Empire.  The second sub-section starts with the 
February Revolution of 1917 and points out the flaws of the new Provisional 
Government during the April and July crises respectively. 
 The second chapter, which constitutes the subject matter of this thesis, 
scrutinizes the mysterious affair between the Premier, A.F. Kerensky, and the newly 
appointed Commander-in-Chief, L.G. Kornilov.  For a better understanding of what 
happened in the summer of 1917, the second chapter is also divided into two sub-
sections.  The first one is concentrated on the differences between the two camps of 
the dramatis personae and the reasons behind Kerensky’s appointment of General 
Kornilov.  The second section begins with the Moscow State Conference of August 
1917, wherein the disagreement between the Premier and the Generalissimo came to 
the surface, and further penetrates the mounting conspiracy following the 
Conference, which resulted in the failed uprising of Kornilov. 
 The final chapter presents an analysis concerning the aftermath of the 
Kornilov Affair.  It provides the reader with an examination of the Affair’s disastrous 
impact on the Provisional Government’s already weakened prestige.  It is argued that 
the conflict between Kornilov and Kerensky seriously damaged the latter’s authority, 
as well as his connection with both conservative and socialist circles.  Kerensky’s 
obsessive fear of counterrevolution from the right had led the Bolsheviks to exploit 
the volatile atmosphere in September 1917.  The major intention of the last chapter 
 5 
is, thus, to discuss the question of how the Bolsheviks became the main beneficiaries 
of the Kornilov Affair and why the Russian people did not resist the Bolshevik 
seizure of power in October.                                 
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CHAPTER I 
1. BACKGROUND 
1.1. The Last Days of Romanov Rule (1914 – 1917) 
 
 
In 1876, Petr Tkachev wrote, “The preparation of a revolution is not the work 
of revolutionaries.  That is the work of exploiters, capitalists, landowners, priests, 
police, officials, liberals, progressives and the like.  Revolutionaries do not prepare, 
they make a revolution.”8  It was indeed the drawbacks of the Russian bureaucracy, 
rather than the revolutionaries, which caused the political awakening of the Russian 
society within the second half of the 19th century.  When the Russian Revolution 
began is a subject for debate.  As in any social episode of history, there is no 
indisputable way of determining the exact beginning of the February Revolution of 
1917.  Richard Pipes argues that the first phase of the Revolution “in the narrow 
sense of the word, began with the violence of 1905”9.  Orlando Figes, on the other 
hand, suggests that the roots of revolutionary movements in Russia might also be 
traced back to the 1860’s, when the sclerotic imperial regime was alarmed by defeat 
in the Crimean War and attempted to take measures of rejuvenation. 
Since the 1860’s, an increasing number of liberal public men, a great deal of 
whom held official titles, came to understand the fact that unless a broad reformation 
was carried out to bridge the gap between rulers and ruled, the political order was 
likely to collapse.  Despite its deficiencies, the government’s reluctant reforms 
showed substantial progress in the industrial domain.10  However, efforts to 
                                                 
8 Tkachev, quoted in Christopher Read, From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their 
Revolution (London: UCL Press, 1996), p.11. 
9 Pipes, The Russian Revolution: 1899 – 1919..., p.xxiii. 
10 The half-century, which followed the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, witnessed a gradual 
amelioration in the national wealth as a result of the government’s industrialization policies and 
foreign investment.  The primary sector in Russian industrialization was the railway network.  The 
network grew from 1360 km in 1856 to 27000 km in 1885.  In 1900 the track became 48000 km and 
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modernize the social structure of the Russian Empire were hindered by conservative 
elements of the bureaucracy, the main purpose of which was “to uphold the status 
quo, cost what it may”.11  The actual causes of the Revolution would thus be found in 
the everyday life of Russian society, above all the increasing exploitation of the 
peasants and workers, as well as the rigid walls that were built against change.  The 
landed nobility, on the other hand, was in gradual decline during the years of 
agricultural depression in the late 19th century, and “was turning to the zemstva12 to 
defend its local agrarian interests against the centralizing and industrializing 
bureaucracy of St. Petersburg”13.  Indeed, as Christopher Read puts it, “The main 
losers from tsarism’s political immobility were a burgeoning and increasingly 
restless middle class and a more and more unsettled landed elite, which feared for its 
own security because tsarism appeared to be less and less capable of ensuring social 
stability.”14  
In brief, throughout the second half of the 19th century the bulk of the Russian 
society - particularly the intelligentsia, the proletariat and the peasantry - were 
generating revolutionary tensions.  The Tsarist regime faced serious crises when the 
government failed to take the necessary measures in dealing with the Famine Crisis 
of 1891-92,15 the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-190516 and the 1905 Revolution.  
                                                                                                                                          
77000 in 1914.  The peasantry, however, which constituted 80 percent of Russia’s population, did not 
experience a considerable improvement.   
Source: Read, From Tsar to Soviets..., p.13. 
11 John Keep, The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1976), p.4. 
12 Following defeat in the Crimean War Alexander II embarked on a reform program, wherein he also 
created elected local governmnet institutions called zemstvos.  The zemstvos operated as county and 
provisional assemblies. 
13 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891 – 1924 (London: Pimlico, 1996), 
p.47. 
14 Christopher Read, From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution (London: UCL 
Press, 1996), p.11. 
 
15 The Russian famine of 1891-92 disturbed an area of around 900,000 square miles in the Volga and 
central agricultural areas.  Oddly enough, these were once the most fertile and productive parts of 
Russia.  The central area that was affected by famine included the provinces of Nizhni-Novgorod, 
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Nevertheless, the actual driving force of the revolutionary movements in 1917, 
characterized by organized opposition against the tsarist autocracy to liberate the 
people, was mostly a product of the First World War.  The instability of late Imperial 
Russia and the deep dissatisfaction of the masses provided plentiful fuel for the fire 
that was sparked by the disastrous course of the First World War.  It was the 
extraordinary conditions of the War – the food shortages in the cities, the 
demoralization and breakdown of the Army – that prevented the government to 
extinguish the rebellion in February 1917 in the same manner as it did in previous 
crises. 
 
1.1.1. The Impact of World War I:  
In August 1914 Russia found herself at war with Austria and Germany.  Even 
though war was the last thing Russia needed, the government felt obliged to resist the 
Austro-German attempt to destroy Serbia, which was perceived as a step toward 
German domination of Europe.  As witnessed in 1904, when the Russo-Japanese war 
broke out, Russia’s declaration of war caused patriotic enthusiasm, a temporary 
moratorium on internal frictions, and substantial public support to assist the 
government’s war efforts17.  While the majority had taken victory for granted, only a 
                                                                                                                                          
Riazan, Tula, Kazan, Simbirsk, Saratov, Penza, Samara and Tambov.  Of the fourteen to twenty 
million people 375,000 to 400,000 died, particularly of disease.  Furthermore, due to malnutrition 
caused by the famine, people were more susceptible to infection; inevitably typhus and cholera struck 
and killed half a million people by the end of 1892.  Source: Richard G. Robbins, Famine in Russia: 
1891-1892 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), p.19. 
 
16 Although Tsar Nicholas II and the Minister of War Kuropatkin had taken victory for granted, 
winning the war proved to be far more difficult than the leaders imagined.  As the war continued the 
Russian military turned out to be poorly equipped and logistical failures increased due to the distance 
between the battlefield and high command in Petrograd.  Soon the war developed into a series of 
disasters and humiliation for Russia.  The defeats fuelled the student protests, workers strikes and 
liberal movements.  Indeed, “so unpopular had the government become that in July 1904, when 
Plehve, its Minister of Interior, was blown into pieces by a bomb planted by the Socialist 
Revolutionary Combat Organization, there was hardly a word of public regret…the citizens of Russia 
were after their rulers’ blood.” (Figes, A People’s Tragedy…, p.171.) 
17 Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution..., p.37. 
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few foresaw what was going to happen.  The former Minister of Interior, P.N. 
Durnovo was among that very few; he warned the Tsar of the disastrous 
consequences for Russia of a war with Germany five months prior to the outbreak of 
the First World War.  In Durnovo’s words,  
“If the war ends in victory, the suppression of the socialist 
movement will not pose any difficulties…But in the case of defeat, 
the chance of which in a struggle with such an opponent as Germany 
it is impossible not to foresee, social revolution inevitably will 
manifest itself in its most extreme forms.  As we already indicated, it 
will start with the Government being held responsible for all the 
failures and misfortunes.  In the legislative institutions a furious 
campaign against it will begin, as a result of which revolutionary 
actions will commence throughout the country.  These actions 
immediately will advance socialist slogans, the only ones which are 
capable of stirring up and rallying the masses.”18 
 
Durnovo’s prognosis was ignored and public morale, once again, turned sour with 
the defeats in 1915.   A great portion of the Russian army consisted of muzhiki and 
there were too few officers and N.C.O.s to maintain a proper defense line.  The 
shortage of telephone wire, and codebooks further increased the number of defeats; 
the Germans, for example, after intercepting the commands, destroyed a Russian 
army in four days near Tannenberg. 
The early optimism, thus, faded away with the reality of war.  The strong 
resentments against the Tsar that were once cloaked by the war were exacerbated by 
the defeats at the battlefields.  Eventually, Nicholas II took over supreme command 
of the army in mid-1915 and his wife, Empress Alexandra, became the autocrat in 
Nicholas’s absence.  The scandalous relationship between Rasputin and the German 
queen, as she was called, caused rumors of treason and the regime’s prestige was 
fatally injured.  Moreover, relations between the Duma and the government 
deteriorated after Rasputin began to exercise a disastrous influence over ministerial 
                                                 
18 Durnovo, quoted in Ronald Kowalski, The Russian Revolution: 1917 – 1921 (London: Routledge, 
1997), p.16.  
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appointments19; Russia had changed five interior ministers and three war ministers in 
ten months.  The already unstable pillars of the old regime, on the eve of the Great 
War, crumbled to dust.  The Russian society was severely alienated, and the political 
and bureaucratic structure became extremely fragile.  The First World War not only 
exposed how weak the autocracy was, but also proved that the regime had lost all its 
legitimacy.  As John Keep argues,  
“The effects of the war upon Russia’s fragile social and economic 
structure were as catastrophic as they were in the military and 
political domain.  Civilians in town and country found themselves 
caught up in a desperate struggle to meet the insatiable demands of a 
conflict in which prospects of victory seemed ever more 
remote…Reactions to the crisis varied according to an individual’s 
social status and his proximity to the front, but all segments of the 
population gradually came to share a feeling that something was 
profoundly wrong with the way the country’s affairs were being 
handled…When the monarchy finally collapsed in February-March 
1917 the pressures that had been building up irresistibly for two and 
a half years burst forth with explosive force.”20 
 
 The Tsarist Generals’ memoirs provide us a valuable source for 
understanding the disastrous impact of the First World War on Russia.  Contrary to 
earlier correlations drawn between the inefficiency of Russian heavy industry in war 
material production and defeats at the battlefields, these sources refer more to 
structural matters as the major reason for disintegration at the eastern front.  General 
Alexei Brusilov, for instance, reported how the regular army vanished and was 
replaced by an army of ignoramuses.  In his memoirs, he makes the situation at the 
southwestern front in 1916 plain.   
“On July 15 (1916), all my armies were waiting for a further 
offensive. The 3rd and ‘Special’ armies have met on the Kovel Sector 
and they had the time to bring up new reinforcements and heavy 
artillery.  In general from May 22 to July 30, the armies entrusted to 
me had comprised 8255 officers, 370,153 soldiers, 144 machine 
guns and 367 mortars, about 100 projectors and an enormous 
                                                 
19 Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution..., p.39. 
20 Keep, The Russian Revolution..., p.28. 
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quantity of rifles, cartridges, shells and different other military 
equipment.  By this time, the winter operation of Southwestern 
armies had finished.  The enemy considered our position certainly 
unapproachable.  At the northern front we took back a significant 
part of our territory, and the center and left flanks won a part of East 
Galicia and all of Bukovina.  
 
I, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, had the right to 
displace commanders, armies, Corps commanders and all 
subordinate army heads.  The Guards with their heads of the Special 
Army, however, had been inaccessible for me. The Tsar personally 
chose them, appointed and replaced them, although it was impossible 
to achieve change of such quantity.  Incompetent management 
during such a crucial moment would mean missing the advantage of 
their fighting glory and increasing vain losses for Russia.  I knew all 
this and wrote about it to Alexeyev (The chief of staff of the 
Southwest front), but it was even very difficult for him to change the 
calamitous nature of this situation.   
 
I, as a soldier studying military science all my life, was tormented 
that the grandiose victory, which could have been carried out 
through appropriate actions from our general headquarters in 1916, 
had been inexcusably missed.  Summing up the fighting work of the 
Southwestern front in 1916, it is necessary to recognize the 
following:  
 
1. In comparison with the hopes assigned on this front for the spring of 
1916, we have surpassed all expectations. We facilitated the position 
of the French and English on their fronts; forced Romania to our side 
and had upset all plans and assumptions of the Austro-German 
alliance for this year. 
2. This operation, however, did not give any strategic results, for the 
decision of the military council of April 1, by any measure, had not 
been executed.  The western front was subject to the main impact 
and had not been operated, and the Northern front received the motto 
familiar to us with Japanese war "patience, patience and patience". 
3. The headquarters, in my belief, failed to execute the means to 
operate all Russian armed forces. It did not operate events; rather 
events operated it, ‘as the wind operates a leaf’. 
4. With those means available for me at the Southwest front, I did 
everything that I could. - I, at least, could not. If instead of me a 
military genius like Julius Caesar or Napoleon had been there, 
maybe, they would have managed to execute something grandiose, 
but such accusations against me were not and could not be 
appropriate.”21 
 
                                                 
21 A.A. Brusilov, Vospominaniya (Moscow: Olma Press, 2004) p.172. (My Translation) 
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As Brusilov describes, by the summer of 1916, the Russian Army, whose 
survival seemed at stake following the retreats of the previous year, was finally ready 
for an offensive.  At least, in terms of the war-material, there was not a major 
shortage.  Nevertheless, the drastic change in the social composition of the army as 
well as problems vis-à-vis conscription since the late 19th century, became crystal 
clear in this period, hindering the development of a successful offensive.  Peter 
Kenez, in his article on the Russian Officer Corps in 1917, presents a substantial 
amount of data collected from the Tsernalnyi Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii 
Arkhiv, arguing that the Russian Army did not have sufficient reserve officers and 
those who served had not received proper training.   
The military laws of 1874 allowed Russian young men with four years of 
education to become a reserve officer after two years of active service and those who 
had six years of education, after one-year service.  During the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1905, however, it became apparent that the performance of reserve officers was 
extremely poor and that a one-year service was not enough to make a civilian into an 
officer.  Hence, in 1912, reserve service was reorganized and the required 
educational background was set at six years while the active service period was 
raised to two years instead of one.  Nonetheless, these reforms were realized only in 
mid 1913 and obviously did not affect the situation in 1914. 22 Indeed, in 1914, the 
Russian army could mobilize only 20,740 reserve officers.23 By contrast, for 
                                                 
22 For more information see Peter Kenez, ‘Changes in the Social Composition of the Officer Corps 
during World War 1’ The Russian Review,Vol 31, no.4, (October 1972), 369-375 and Norman Stone, 
The Eastern Front: 1914-17 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975) 
23 http://militera.lib.ru/h/ww1/02.html 
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example, the Prussian army, which had 22,112 regular officers, mobilized 29,230 
reservists.24  
As Kenez further suggests, the difference between the two-sets of officers 
was obvious; while instances of disloyalty among career officers were extremely rare 
in 1905, the High Command could no longer count on the unquestioning loyalty of 
the reserve officers in 1917.25 The High Command, however, was desperate for 
officers and used every available source.26  “Even in April 1914, a few months 
before the outbreak of the war, there were 3,380 unfilled places in the officer corps.  
During 1915 the shortage reached crisis proportions…at the end of 1915 there were 
15,777 vacancies in the officer corps.”27 Similarly, Norman Stone explains the 
problematic conscription system in his book on The Eastern Front; 
 “Legend has a picture of countless millions of peasant soldiers being 
thrust into battle, armed with long-handled axes, against 
overpowering German artillery and machine-guns.  It is a legend that 
owes almost nothing to reality; indeed, reality was the very reverse 
of legend.  The army by the beginning of the 1916 campaign, was 
not suffering from material shortage of any significance, any more 
than other armies; it did however, experience remarkable difficulties 
in using the countless millions of peasant soldiers alleged to be 
available for conscription.  The front-line strength was less than that 
of France, with less than a quarter of Russia’s population, until mid-
1916.”28   
 
Similarly, Kerensky in 1965, wrote: “When years later, I read what Hindenburg, 
Ludendorff, and Hoffmann had to say in their memoirs about the Russian army in 
1917 and compared their accounts with those of our own Russian generals, I found, 
                                                 
24 Karl Demeter, Das Deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Staat, 1650-1945(Frankfurt am Main 
: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1964), p.47 
25 Kenez, ‘Changes in the Social Composition …’ p.371. 
26 With the exception of certain minorities (i.e. Finns Central Asian Republics and especially Jews.)  
27 Kenez, ‘Changes in the Social Composition …’ p.371. 
28 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front: 1914-17 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), p.212 
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to my surprise, that the German generals gave a more balanced and favorable picture 
of our military record at that time than did our own generals.”29 
In the course of 1916, the High Command managed to solve the problem by 
establishing various officer training schools, and in January 1917 there were only 
226 unfilled places.30 Training thousands of officers was a great achievement, 
especially in wartime conditions, yet the quality was fatally damaged because the 
Empire lacked sufficient financial resources for proper training.  Lack of 
understanding and confidence between junior and senior officers was another cause 
of disorganization during the war, but more importantly, it had even more 
catastrophic consequences in the Revolution and in the Civil War.  As Kenez puts it 
“When the High Command decided to oppose the Provisional Government, the 
rank-and-file officers did not go along, and the Kornilov mutiny disintegrated after 
the government jailed a handful of generals. In the Civil War when the graduates of 
the Academy of the General Staff – men like Alekseyev, Kornilov and Denikin – 
called on their fellow officers to fight the Bolsheviks, only an insignificant 
proportion answered their call.”31   
Change in the character and mentality of pre-revolutionary officer corps is 
another significant aspect of the Revolution and Civil War.  In terms of ideas the 
Russian officers had a lot in common with their European counterparts.  As far as 
social background was concerned, however, the Russian officers were much 
different.  During the second half of the 19th century a great number of non-nobles 
                                                 
29 Alexander Kerensky, Russia and History’s Turning Point (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
1965) p.295.  
30 Kenez, ‘Changes in the Social Composition …’ p.373. 
31 ibid, p.375 
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received commissions in the German or French armies, however this ‘process of 
increasing social heterogeneity’ went even further in Russia.32  As Kenez puts it,  
“By the time of the First World War approximately half of the 
officers came from non-noble families.  This great influx changed 
the character of the officer corps.  While in Germany and France 
the newcomers were quickly absorbed and the middle-class young 
men were assimilated into military society by their aristocratic 
colleagues, the Russian corps became fragmented.  The scions of 
ancient noble families served in guards regiments, where they 
enjoyed many privileges: they advanced quickly through the ranks 
and participated in the pleasures of the social life of the capital.  By 
contrast, the average non-noble officer was likely to serve in the 
infantry stationed in an outlying district, and to receive such a 
meager salary that he could hardly support his wife and children.  
As 19th century Russian literature amply illustrates, such a man 
enjoyed little social prestige.  Yet, for many ambitious young men 
of peasant families who could not afford an education, the military 
school was an avenue of social mobility.  While the great majority 
of these men never rose very high in the military hierarchy, there 
was room for the talented and ambitious.”33 
 
During the First World War sons and grandsons of serfs commanded armies and 
some of these generals played major roles in the White movement.  General M.V. 
Alekseyev, A.I. Denikin and L.G. Kornilov were the sons of serfs or lower-middle 
class men34. Although these men often did not question the political status quo, they 
did not regard themselves as conservatives.  They were faithful to the doctrine 
according to which the Army stood above politics and carried out the orders to 
suppress revolutionaries, peasant rebellions and workers’ protests.  Kenez further 
argues that this ideology was best reflected in their struggle against the Bolsheviks 
after the October coup: “Their safe 19th century world, in which it was enough to 
                                                 
32 Peter Kenez, ‘The Ideology of the White Movement’ Soviet Studies, Vol.32, No.1 (Jan 1980), 58 -
83 
33 Ibid, p. 60 
34 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front: 1914-17 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), p.21. 
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accept the status quo unquestioningly, crumbled under two heavy blows.  The first 
was World War 1…The second blow was the Revolution.”35  
The impact of war transcended the military domain and plagued the whole 
Russian land, trapping the imperial regime.  Norman Stone suggests that the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 is a result of the war: “The First World War provoked a crisis of 
economic modernization, and Bolshevik Revolution was the outcome”.36  Likewise, 
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argues that the war ‘had the most direct and decisive impact, 
triggering the revolution’.37  The Romanov Dynasty was not as lucky as it was in the 
1905 Revolution; the old regime collapsed a year before the ceasefire in Europe.       
 
1.1. 2 The Rising: February 1917 
The immediate cause of the February Revolution of 1917 might be perceived 
as the downfall of the tsarist regime under the huge pressure of the World War I.  
The actual causes are related with the strong resentments among Russian society 
towards the intolerable wartime conditions and the irreconcilable bureaucratic 
contradictions that the Tsarist regime had no capacity to resolve.  Mobilization of the 
army caused a serious recession in the economy, diminishing the food supply.  In 
major towns, goods and services became scarce, and the inflation rates increased 
drastically38.  While public discontent mounted and the confidence of the army 
                                                 
35 Peter Kenez, ‘The Ideology of the White Movement’ … p.76 
36 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front: 1914-17 … p.285. 
37 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ‘The February Revolution’, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, et.al., eds., 
Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution: 1914 – 1921(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 
p.48. 
 
38 The Percentage Increase in Food Prices, December 1916 – February 1917 
Potatoes   25  Bread   15 
Carrots, turnips  35  Chocolate  100 
Cabbage   25  Sugar Candy  75 
Meat   20  Cookies, sweet rolls  100 
Sausage   50  Apples   70 
Ham   60  Pears, oranges  150 
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vanished, the imperial regime ignored the Duma’s warnings of a possible revolution.  
Wartime expenditures and the government’s loss of control over the state’s finances 
became Russia’s major problem and led to the February Revolution of 1917.39   
The growing wave of food and wage strikes, protests and radical 
movements in Petrograd developed into a spontaneous revolution in February.  It 
began, on February 23 1917; International Women’s Day gave the women textile 
workers the excuse to stream into the streets and shout their demands.  The 
demonstrations were welcomed by the 90000 striking workers, whose major 
slogans manifested the need for bread.  Despite several clashes with police, the 
workers refused to scatter and gradually took control of the streets; even though no 
major casualties were witnessed, at the end of the day tension reached its climax.  
The protests grew even larger on the next day; almost half of the Petrograd workers 
participated in the campaigns.  The language used in the workers’ protests’ slogans 
became sharper as well, targeting the autocracy and its war-mongering.  On 
February 25, strikes and demonstrations became rife throughout the whole city.  
With the intensification of violence between the police and the demonstrators, the 
number of casualties increased.  Cossack troops, on the other hand, which were 
called to assist the police and supposed to intimidate, acted reluctantly to suppress 
the protests.  Consequently, the workers seized numerous police stations and took 
                                                                                                                                          
Butter   15  Cheese   25 
Eggs   20  Milk   40 
 
Source: T. Hasegawa, The February Revolution: Petrograd 1917 (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1981), p.200. 
 
39 “There was a demand for money that existing gold reserves could not cover…Pre-war expenditure 
had amounted to less than 3,500 million roubles per annum. Wartime expenditure rose far beyond this 
level: 9,500 million roubles in 1915, 15,300 roubles in 1916, of which the War ministry accounted for 
11,400 million.  Russia spent $27,800,000 per day in wartime, more even than France or Great 
Britain.” Source: Norman Stone, The Eastern Front: 1914-17 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1975), p.287. 
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control of a substantial amount of small arms.  In the meantime, the first elections 
to the Petrograd Soviet of Worker’s Deputies were held in various factories.40 
 The government’s call for the Petrograd garrison to contain the uprising 
proved to be futile.  On February 26 the workers encountered the soldiers in the 
streets, where most workers tried to associate with their fellow soldiers.  At the 
outset, the soldiers fired to order, killing and wounding the workers.  Later, 
however, the workers resisted until the soldiers faltered and let them pass through 
the lines.  Although the Duma was dissolved on Nicholas’s decree, most deputies 
reassembled and organized clandestine meetings, establishing a provisional 
committee to take the necessary measures in the absence of the Duma.  Finally, on 
February 27, all regiments of the Petrograd garrison, one by one joined the 
workers’ movement, demonstrating the victory of the revolution.  Almost 170,000 
men joined the revolution within 24 hours, preparing the way for the united 
workers and soldiers to seize power in the capital.41 
The revolution caused the immediate dissolution of the imperial regime.  
Political authority switched to two new bodies - the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and 
                                                 
40 Chernov, Viktor, Rozhdenie Revoliutsionnoi Rosii (Fevralskaia Revoliutsia) (Paris, 1934)  
41 According to the data subsequently produced by the military commission of the Duma (Provisional) 
Committee, the mutiny in the army developed as follows: 
Date   Time   No. of Mutineers 
March 11  Afternoon  600 
March 12  Morning   10,200 
   Mid-day   25,700 
   Evening   66,700 
March 13  Morning   72,200 
   Mid-day   112,000 
   Evening   127,000 
March 14  Morning   144,700 
   Mid-day   170,000 
Source: Alan Moorehead, The Russian Revolution (London: Collins and Hamish Hamilton, 1958), 
p.166. 
  
(On January 31, 1918, the Soviet government adopted the Gregorian calendar, which moved dates by 
thirteen days.  The dates in this quotation are marked according to the Julian, Old calendar.) 
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Soldiers' Deputies, and the Provisional Government.  Without delay, the Soviet 
commissioned a group to deal with the ongoing food supply problem in Petrograd, 
appointed revolutionary detachments to the government offices of the collapsed 
regime and freed a great number of political prisoners42.  The ministers of the old 
regime were detained on February 28, and Izvestia, the official organ of the Soviet, 
was published.  Nevertheless, the Soviet had another serious concern: How to get the 
troops to return to their barracks. 
The military commission of the Provisional Government ordered the 
mutineers to get back to their garrisons and obey the commands of their officers.  
Most soldiers, however, thought that they would be punished for participating in the 
mutiny and asked for immunity.  Moreover, there was general mistrust towards the 
Provisional Government for their support of the officers, and they turned to the 
Soviet for protection.  As Hasegawa argues, “Thus the decisive and unbridgeable 
gulf that separated the lower strata of society from the ‘privileged’ strata became 
apparent.  Alarmed by the possibility that the insurgents might push the Petrograd 
Soviet to assume governmental power, the Soviet Executive Committee decided to 
hasten the formation of a bourgeois Provisional Government by negotiating directly 
with the Provisional Committee.”43  The outcome was the publication of Order No. 
1, one of the most crucial documents written after the February Revolution.  As Figes 
puts it,  
“The Order was a popular creation in the full sense of the term.  
Sukhanov watched as Sokolov sat at a table surrounded on all sides 
by soldiers, standing sitting and leaning on the table, half dictating 
and half-suggesting to Sokolov what he should write…There was no 
                                                 
42 The leadership of the Petrograd Soviet was immediately taken by a self-appointed Executive 
Committee, which was in turn dominated by three socialist intellectuals, N.N. Sukhanov, N.D 
Sokolov, and Iu. M. Stelkov.  
43 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ‘The February Revolution’, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, et.al., eds., 
Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution: 1914 – 1921(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 
p.57. 
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agenda and no discussion of any kind, everyone spoke, and all were 
completely absorbed in the work, formulating their collective 
opinion without any voting…When the work was finished they put a 
heading on the sheet: ‘Order No.1’.”44    
 
On March 1, Order No. 1 was issued by Izvestia.  According to the terms 
laid down in the document, the soldiers and the sailors were to recognize the 
supreme authority of the Soviet in political affairs; they were to follow only the 
orders that did not conflict with the commands of the Soviet; they were to elect 
committees that would exercise full control over weapons; they were to comply 
with precise military discipline.  Moreover, harsh and humiliating treatment by 
officers was prohibited by Order No.1; disputes between soldiers' committees and 
officers were to be submitted to the Soviet for settlement; off-duty soldiers and 
sailors were to enjoy full civil rights; and saluting of officers was abolished.45 
 The front-line soldiers, as well of those at the rear, expressed their hopes that 
would, to some extent, reiterate and develop various items of Order No. 1. As Marc 
Ferro puts it,  
“The soldiers aired grievances against their officers for the abuses 
they had suffered: excessive penalties, acts of violence, coarse 
language, injustice and arbitrary punishment.  Soldiers were human 
beings – they would no longer accept humiliating practices such as 
the use of familiar forms of address and other degrading formulas 
like saluting and standing at attention.  As citizens they demanded 
the rights that henceforth would be enjoyed by civilians – access to 
information, right of assembly, debate, petition.  Order No.1 stated 
that soldiers in the ranks and on active duty were under the strictest 
discipline, but that in their private and political lives they could not 
be denied the rights, possessed by all other citizens.”  46 
These wishes were constantly reiterated in the great numbers of resolutions that 
were intended to transform the entire army statute.  Without doubt, the Kornilov 
                                                 
44 Figes, A People’s Tragedy…, p.330. 
45 James White, The Russian Revolution: A Short History (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), p.75. 
46 Marc Ferro, ‘The Russian Soldier in 1917: Undisciplined, Patriotic and Revolutionary’ Slavic 
Review, Vol.30, No.3 (Sep., 1971), p.485 
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crisis, which was to shake the pillars of the Provisional Government in August, is 
closely related to the transformation of the Russian Army especially after Order. 
No.1.  Having witnessed a gradual disorganization of his troops, Kornilov labored 
to convince the government to introduce the death penalty at the front.  The 
Premier, Kerensky, however, turned down this offer in order not to irritate the 
Soviet.  As Ferro further suggests, “Order No.1 had outraged the officer class, for it 
struck a blow at their rights of decision and command.  The roles were reversed in 
that the soldiers had dictated a decision, and it was one that had the specific effect 
of restricting officers’ rights.”47    
Although this was a moment when the Soviet had a chance to takeover 
unchallenged authority in Petrograd, the parties failed to give political leadership to 
the workers and soldiers.  The main reason behind this was that the members of the 
Soviet, to a large extent, did not want to jeopardize Russia’s war efforts, and 
deemed it necessary to wage a defensive war against imperial Germany.  
Furthermore, the majority of the revolutionary parties in Russia, who had been 
active for the previous two decades were caught unprepared and lacked an agenda 
for this sudden revolution.  Indeed, even the Bolsheviks were unable to propose 
their plan - demanding an end to the war, transference of all power to the Soviets, 
and immediate seizure of land by the peasantry - until their leader’s return from 
exile in April.  Nonetheless, by March 1917, the Bolsheviks were a minority in the 
Petrograd Soviet, which was dominated mostly by the Socialist Revolutionaries 
and Mensheviks.  Besides, contrary to the Bolsheviks, the two main parties of the 
Soviet thought that the war with Germany should continue, and a period of 
                                                 
47 ibid, p.487 
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capitalist development should be experienced in order for a mature background to 
emerge for an ideal socialist order.   
Figes argues that the tragedy of the ‘Glorious February’ lies in the very fact 
that the Soviets missed their only chance to resolve the revolution in a democratic 
and socialist form. 
“While the Soviet leaders wanted to restore order, most of them 
had no intention of assuming power.  The whole basis of their 
strategy was to pressurize the Duma leaders into forming a 
‘bourgeois government’.  Thus there arose what Trotsky later 
called the ‘paradox of the February: that a revolution made in the 
streets resulted in a government made in the salons.  This was a 
recurring pattern throughout the politics of 1917: there were 
several moments (February, April, July and September) when the 
Soviet leaders might have taken power, when indeed the crowds 
came out on to the streets with the express demand that they do 
just that, but on each occasion they shied away from the 
responsibilities of the government…The Bolsheviks reaped the 
benefits.” 48             
The Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee held a meeting on the evening of 
March 1.  They discussed the possible formulas for formation of a government and 
decided that the Duma Provisional Committee should be encouraged to exercise 
power.  The majority of the members further decided that Soviet intervention in 
this matter should be restricted to a number of issues, such as the monitoring of 
their implementation and the right of veto over ministerial decisions.  Finally, the 
establishment of the Provisional Government and its supreme authority was 
recognized until the Constituent Assembly met to decide Russia’s future.  It was 
decided that the Provisional Government49 should assume the responsibilities that 
had been previously carried out by the imperial Council of Ministers. 
                                                 
48 Figes, A People’s Tragedy…, p.331. 
49 Prince Georgii Lvov, a liberal minded landowner who was the head of the Zemstvo League, became 
the head of the new Provisional Government.  He formed a cabinet, which included Pavel Milyukov, a 
Cadet Party member, as Foreign Minister, Alexander Kerensky as the Minister of Justice. 
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Late at night on March 2nd Tsar Nicholas II received Guchkov and finalized 
the inevitable, bringing an end to the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty.  The act of 
abdication concluded that, “In agreement with the Imperial Duma, We have 
thought it right to abdicate from the throne of the Russian State, and to lay down 
the supreme power.  Not wishing to part with Our dear son, We hand over Our 
inheritance to Our brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich and give him Our 
blessing to mount the throne of the Russian State…May the Lord God help 
Russia.”50  The Grand Duke, however, announced that he would accept the throne 
only if the Constituent Assembly made such an offer by its free consent.    
At the fall of the Tsarist Government, there was an outburst of joy among 
the soldiers at the front as well as by those at the rear.  As Ferro argues, “The 
letters and telegrams they (soldiers) sent to the Petrograd Soviet and the 
Provisional Government divulged their miseries, desires and aspirations.”51 Still, 
there were doubts about the effectiveness of the new Provisional Government.  The 
major one was the existence of the Government’s competitor, the Soviet of 
Worker’s and Soldier’s Deputies; the February Revolution had created two self-
constituted authorities instead of one.  This `dual power` relationship was to create 
serious problems throughout the period between February and October, hampering 
the long-desired democracy in Russia.  As War Minister Guchkov broadly defines 
it, 
“The Provisional Government does not possess any real power; and 
its directives are carried out only to the extent that it is permitted by 
the Soviet of Worker’s and Soldier’s Deputies, which enjoys all the 
essential elements of real power, since the troops, the railroads, the 
post and telegraph are all in its hands.  One can say flatly that the 
                                                 
50 Nicholas II, quoted in Moorehead, p.173. 
51 Marc Ferro, ‘The Russian Soldier in 1917: Undisciplined, Patriotic and Revolutionary’ Slavic 
Review, Vol.30, No.3 (Sep., 1971), p.488 
 
 24 
Provisional Government exists only so long as it is permitted by the 
Soviet.”52 
In short, the most important result of the February 1917 revolution was the 
sudden death of the Tsarist regime, which previously had been the sole authority to 
control all the state institutions and the society.  The Provisional Government, which 
replaced the Tsarist authority, was impotent in ensuring the integrity of Russia at 
war, and lacked a coherent ideology to pursue the goals of those who realized the 
February Revolution.  Nor was the Petrograd Soviet able to fill the political vacuum 
in the aftermath of the collapsed regime.  The February Revolution, “thus marked 
both the end of the old regime and the beginning of a new revolutionary process.”53 
 
1.2.Crisis of Authority 
In the aftermath of the February triumph in Petrograd, the revolution spread 
like wildfire and gave birth to two parallel systems of government throughout the 
country, wherein the Soviets functioned alongside the local authorities, who were 
subordinates of the Provisional Government.  The Provisional Government, in the 
legal sense, was set to correspond to the interests of the bourgeois revolution, 
whereas the Soviet would speak for the people’s revolution.  Hence the bilateral 
relationship between the local authorities and the Soviets would be ‘complementary’ 
rather than ‘competitive’ and the ‘dual power’ would enhance the cooperation 
between the liberal and socialist factions of Russia.  The Provisional Government 
enjoyed an extensive prestige at the outset; it dispersed the Tsarist police force; 
abolished restrictions on freedom of speech, press and association; cancelled the 
discriminatory laws.  Nevertheless, ‘behind the scenes, the government began to 
                                                 
52 Guchkov, quoted in Fitzpatrick p.47. 
53 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ‘The February Revolution’, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, et.al., eds., 
Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution: 1914 – 1921(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 
p.60. 
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suffer from its internal divisions, which reinforced a tendency for each minister (and 
even assistant minister) to pursue his own policy’. 54  Furthermore, the debates over 
the vague constitutional state of the Provisional Government remained popular.  
Lenin, in his April Thesis, particularly emphasizes the peculiar nature of the dual 
power, 
“The highly important feature of the Russian revolution is the fact 
that the Petrograd Soviet of Soldier’s and Worker’s Deputies, which, 
as everything goes to show, enjoys the confidence of most of the 
local Soviets, is voluntarily transferring state power to the 
bourgeoisie, and its Provisional Government, is voluntarily ceding 
supremacy to the latter, having entered into an agreement to support 
it, and is limiting its own role to that of an observer, a supervisor of 
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (the date for which has 
not even been announced as yet by the Provisional Government).  
This remarkable feature, unparalleled in history in such a form, has 
led to the interlocking of two dictatorships: the dictatorship of the 
bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
peasantry…There is not the slightest doubt that such an interlocking 
cannot last long.”55   
 
Moreover, there were two challenging problems vis-à-vis the legitimacy of the 
Provisional Government – the social problems and the ongoing war. 56  The 
Bolsheviks led by their exiled leader did not fail to spot these two points.    
The first one concerned urgent social problems, most importantly the 
distribution of the land to the peasantry, on which the Government hesitated to take 
action.  The Provisional Government declared that it could not make such 
fundamental changes until the Constitutional Assembly’s meeting.  The meeting in 
question, however, would be postponed for security reasons, since the country was 
under occupation.  Thus, the desired outcome of the February revolution was 
already put off to an unclear date by the Provisional government.  As a matter of 
                                                 
54 Howard White, ‘The provisional Government’, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, et.al., eds., 
Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution: 1914 – 1921(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 
p.394. 
55 V.I. Lenin, The April Thesis (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p.28. 
56 SBKP, Sovyetler Birligi Komunist Partisi Tarihi (Ankara: Aydinlik Yayinlari, 1970), p.218. 
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fact, the liberals, who were a majority in the Government, were concerned about 
the transfer of political power to various socialist parties in the Constituent 
Assembly, hence, decided to wait for an Allied victory in the war to gain upper 
hand. 
With respect to the second problem, on the other hand, the Provisional 
Government was to be confronted with a much more serious opposition from the 
Bolsheviks.  There was a split between the Provisional Government and the 
Petrograd Soviet regarding the plans for the ongoing war.  Whereas the Provisional 
Government was determined to continue the war until victory had been won, the 
Petrograd Soviet strongly rejected this notion.  Even though Milyukov stressed the 
former imperial regime’s secret contracts with the Allied powers, which guaranteed 
the acquisition of Constantinople and annexation of further territories, the 
Petrograd Soviet disavowed the succession of such secret agreements and called 
for peace.  Milyukov, in his diplomatic note to Russia’s warring allies, argued that 
“The government under the old regime was, of course, incapable of 
grasping and sharing these ideas of the liberating character of the 
war, of the establishment of solid foundations for the peaceful 
existence of nations, of self-determination for oppressed 
peoples…But free Russia, however, can now speak in a language 
that will be comprehensible to the leading democracies…and now 
she hastens to add her voice to those of her allies.  Imbued with this 
new spirit of a free democracy, the Declaration of the Provisional 
Government cannot of course, give the slightest cause to think that 
the Revolution has entailed any weakening of Russia’s role in the 
common struggle of the Allies.”57 
     
Milyukov’s emphasis on prosecuting the war to a ‘victorious conclusion’ 
rather than an immediate and non-annexationist peace triggered mass 
demonstrations in April.  The continuation of imperial ambitions through 
                                                 
57 Milyukov, quoted in Kowalski, The Russian Revolution…, p.55. 
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Milyukov’s foreign policy- and the Provisional Government in general - caused a 
deep disappointment among the workers and soldiers in Petrograd.  As to the rest 
of the Russian people, there were divergent views concerning the ongoing war.  
The conciliatory policies of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were 
still supported by many workers, soldiers, and peasants, who believed that the 
Provisional Government would settle ‘every’ dispute in Russia by peaceful means 
and that the war continued for the survival of their motherland.  Lenin called these 
people ‘honest but misled supporters of war’.58           
1.2.1 The Provisional Government and The Rise of the Bolsheviks 
The conflict between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet 
was exacerbated within eight months, reaching its climax in the form of the 
October coup.  Bearing in mind the political conversion of the Soviets from local 
organizations, which had previously encouraged parliamentary democracy, into 
mere pawns serving the interests of revolutionary socialists, the fatal mistakes of 
the Provisional government become clearer.  Had the Provisional Government 
proposed earlier solutions to the urgent problems of the country, such as the 
reorganization of economy, enhancement of the food supply mechanism, 
continuation of industrial reforms, and the redistribution of the land to the 
peasantry, the troubled ‘dual power’ system might have been cured.  The 
government, however, concentrated its efforts on the war, and fueled the 
antagonism among the workers and peasants against the government, compelling 
them to turn to the Soviets.  This conviction was to be further reinforced by the 
Bolsheviks upon the arrival of Lenin in April.   
                                                 
58 Ibid., p.219. 
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Upon his arrival in Petrograd, Lenin immediately issued his famous ‘April 
Thesis’, the ideological basis of which was manifested in the slogans ‘Peace, Land, 
Bread’, and ‘All Power to the Soviets’.  Lenin’s April Thesis had become the 
primary pamphlet that revealed the struggle plan for the transition from the 
bourgeois revolution to the socialist revolution.  According to this plan, the 
economic transition would be realized through the nationalization of all land, 
confiscation of the properties of the landowners (zemlya), and the merger of all 
banks within a single body under the auspices of the Soviet of workers’ deputies59.   
Developments in Petrograd, following the Bolshevik conference, 
contributed to Lenin’s ambitions.  Milyukov’s persistence over the continuation of 
war, and the note he had previously sent to the Allied powers regarding Russia’s 
commitment to the secret agreements of the former imperial regime were all 
policies in sharp contradiction with those of the Petrograd Soviet that rejected all 
further annexations and reparations.60  April became the month of mounted tension, 
which eventually triggered widespread armed demonstrations led by the workers 
and soldiers.  In this sense, Miliukov’s diplomatic note might be perceived as the 
‘immediate and most easily reducible cause of the April Crisis’61, for it explicitly 
demonstrated the conflict between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd 
Soviet over the course of Russian foreign policy.  Although there was a moment 
when the government was about to comply with General Lavr Georgiyevich 
Kornilov’s suggestion of curbing the demonstrations by force, the Petrograd Soviet 
decided to take up the control of the garrison and calmed the frustrated soldiers.  
The political crisis was temporarily solved with the resignations of Milyukov and 
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Guchkov.  Yet, it also demonstrated just how weak the Provisional Government 
was, ‘deprived of the single most important means of exercising its authority’.62  
The Provisional Government was reorganized in early May; Kerensky became the 
minister of war, and the socialists received 6 out of 15 cabinet posts.  Meanwhile, a 
prominent revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, returned from exile in May, and joined the 
Bolshevik Party.               
In most histories of 1917, the April Crisis appears as the first in a series of 
major political crises and as a harbinger of the polarized and radicalized landscape 
of later months.  The April Crisis generated substantial support for the Bolshevik 
Party.  Nonetheless, when the first all-Russian Congress of Soviets convened in the 
capital on June 3, the Bolsheviks were still a minority whereas the Mensheviks and 
the Socialist Revolutionaries held the majority.63  The new coalition government 
led by Lvov and Kerensky, on the other hand, was being confronted with severe 
economic and social problems from the very day it took office; the risk of famine 
threatened major cities due to the ongoing food supply problem, prices 
skyrocketed, and the number of striking workers increased causing further 
industrial recession.  Although previously giving support to the Provisional 
Government, the Congress of Soviets responded to the escalating crisis by favoring 
the state monopolies, which produced basic items such as bread.  Despite the new 
troubles of post-February Russian society, the new government, once again, 
postponed all problems for the Constituent Assembly.  Even more, on July 16, 
Kerensky tried to halt the demonstrations by ordering an offensive, which ended up 
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with an absolute disaster, and disorganization of the army, thus, contributing to the 
Bolsheviks’ cause. 
The Congress of Soviets, observing the strong resentment of workers and 
soldiers against Kerensky’s offensive, was compelled to adopt a resolution, which 
called for a meeting of the Constituent Assembly no later than September 30.  The 
Congress organized a huge demonstration, led by 400,000 Petrograd workers, 
which further revealed the growing influence of the Bolshevik Party on the 
working class in the capital.  July 3, 4, and 5 became the pinnacle of the mounting 
protests and witnessed a spontaneous armed demonstration of 500,000 workers, 
soldiers and of the Kronshtadt sailors. Once more, the slogans depicted the 
Bolshevik Party propaganda, such as ‘Down with the war’, or ‘All power to the 
Soviets’.64  Finally, the demonstrators denounced the Provisional Government, 
advanced on the Tauride Palace, the headquarters of the Congress of the Soviets, 
and forced the Soviets to assume all power.65  
Surprisingly, the initial Bolshevik policy was to contain the demonstrators 
and keep them peaceful.  When the Bolsheviks found themselves leading the 
movement, they quickly realized that it was easy to seize power in Petrograd, yet 
impossible to hold it without the support of the soldiers at the front and the 
peasants.  Therefore, the policy of their leadership in the demonstrations was 
announced as safeguarding peace in the capital.  Nonetheless, the Congress of 
Soviets accused the Bolsheviks of attempting a revolutionary movement and called 
on the troops from the front to suppress this insurrection.  The soldiers, following 
their arrival to the capital on July 5, undermined the uprising and recognized the 
supreme authority of the Congress in Russia.  Kerensky replaced Lvov as Prime 
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Minister while holding the portfolios of War and the Navy.66  He formed a 
coalition government of both socialist and Kadet wings in two weeks.  On July 10th 
General Kornilov assumed command of the armed forces on Kerensky’s offer.  
Moreover, Kerensky ordered the disarming and dispersal of the mutinying units 
and reduced the Petrograd Garrison to 100,000 men.  Despite the new 
government’s initial display of resolve, however, Kerensky failed to crush the 
Bolshevik Party when he had the chance.  Richard Pipes argues that the reason 
behind this reluctance was evident; ‘The July putsch imbued Kerensky with an 
obsessive fear that the right would exploit the Bolshevik threat to stage a 
monarchist coup’.67 Ironically, Kerensky’s indulgent treatment of the Bolsheviks, 
who were about to overthrow him and the new government within the course of the 
July Days, would be in sharp contradiction with his impulsive reactions against his 
new commander in chief.  
1.2.2 The White General 
Born in 1870 at a Siberian garrison town68, Lavr Georgiyevich Kornilov was 
the son of a Cossack peasant officer. 69   As W.H. Chamberlin describes, Kornilov 
was a picturesque personality, and full of Eastern color; “Kornilov’s slanting eyes, 
slight, erect figure and Mongolian physiognomy suggest that in his veins flowed the 
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blood of some Oriental people.”70  Although lacking family inheritance, land, and 
money, Kornilov, by a Herculean effort, made his way into the Omsk military school 
when he was 13, where he studied with eagerness and on release had the highest 
grades among the cadets.  He, then, entered the Artillery School of Petrograd. By 
achieving a phenomenal academic record, he was designated by his commander to a 
post at the Academy of Joint Staff.  Lieutenant Kornilov served in the Staff College 
for three years, where he received a silver medal and became captain ahead of 
schedule - his surname had been inscribed on a marble roll of honor.71   "This modest 
and timid artillery officer, thin and short, with his Mongolian personality had 
survived successfully in the academy and during the examinations completed all 
science courses at once,"72 General A. Bogaevsky later recollected in his memoirs. 
Kornilov owes his reputation to a number of factors, all of which he had 
solely accomplished by his own virtue.  He had become familiar with several Turkic 
languages and various dialects, whereby he also learned their customs.  It was the 
reason for his personal bodyguards, who were mostly Tekintzy73 or Turcoman 
warriors, being devoted to him.  He received his first post in Turkestan and served in 
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the frontline, which was located on the Afghani border.  The Pathan Revolt of 1897 
served as an instrument for the Russians to revitalize their interests in Afghanistan 
wherein Captain Kornilov managed to obtain crucial documents about the precise 
locations of the Afghani fortifications74.  His prudence and success in this critical 
task brought him a substantial amount of fame.  From 1899 to 1904, he traveled 
thousand kilometers, visited Persia, Afghanistan, China and India, constantly risking 
his life.75  General Lukomsky wrote in his memoirs that Kornilov also published a 
book in 1901 called Kashgaria and East Turkestan or (The Land of Kashgar), which 
gained popularity in the1900’s – although the existence of such a publication was not 
certain prior to the 1970’s.76 
Following his mission in Turkistan, he fought in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905 and later served as a military attaché in China.  For four years he 
conducted diplomatic affairs vis-à-vis military matters, meeting English, French, and 
German diplomats. As an old habit he traveled all across Mongolia and most parts of 
China.  Having returned to Russia, Lavr Georgevich became commander of a 
Warsaw military district, but soon left for an Eastern district (Zaamursky). In 1912, 
he was the commander of a brigade in Siberia (Vladivostok) 77. 
He became the commander of a brigade on the Carpathian front in World War 
I (48th infantry division, which is a part of III Army of A. Brusilov). 78  He fought in 
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Galicia and the Carpathians. On Austro-Hungarian territories, he fought side by side 
with the 4th rifle brigade of general A. Denikin – part of VIII Army.  Following the 
first winter, despite serious casualties, the 48th division received the name "Steel" for 
its valorous actions. "Strange business”, recollected Brusilov, " The general 
(Kornilov) never neglected his division… he sustained horrifying losses but never 
left the front… the officers and soldiers loved him for he trusted them... He was 
brave indeed, but he sometimes climbed forward rashly".79 
Even though Kornilov’s soldiers cheered his distinguished personal courage, 
as Brusilov recollected, he was not a great commander of large military units. On 
May 4th 1915, two days after the successful German offensive had begun, it became 
apparent that the Germans were not fast enough to capture the Carpathian part of III 
Army and to cut the connection between III Army and the neighboring VIII Army.  
“Only one division – Kornilov’s – was caught” as Norman Stone puts it, “partly 
because its order to retreat came too late, partly because its supply-routes were taken 
up with other troops’ supplies, partly because Kornilov foolishly counter attacked: he 
surrendered on 6th May, with all but five guns.”80 Nevertheless, other accounts of 
Kornilov’s capture shed a different light on the matter.  General Lukomsky, for 
instance, wrote: “During, the withdrawal of the army from the Carpathian 
Mountains, while covering, with a handful of heroes, the retreat of his division, 
General Kornilov was severely wounded and taken prisoner by the Austrians.”81   
His escape from the Austrians marked the true beginning of the 
Generalissimo’s term of influence as a national celebrity.  Admiral Bubnov, the 
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naval representative at Stavka, writes: “General Kornilov was by nature an infinitely 
brave, honorable, upright and straightforward man, totally imbued with a feeling of 
his military duty.  Thanks to his personal bravery, demonstrated in battle, and thanks 
to his brave escape from German (sic. Austrian actually) captivity he enjoyed in the 
army an almost legendary fame, and despite his strictness and exacting demands in 
service, the soldiers loved him and were devoted to him.”82 Nevertheless some 
generals such as Bouch-Bruyevich and Bogaevski strongly criticized Kornilov’s 
arbitrariness.  Bruyevich, for instance, who later fought in the Red Army, wrote:  
“In the spring of 1915, when the Russian army was retreating from 
Galicia and his division was surrounded, Kornilov ignominiously 
deserted it and fled, though it was through his fault that the division 
had fallen into the trap.  Four days later he surrendered himself to the 
enemy, and, later still, escaped by bribing a Czech surgeon’s 
assistant named Franz Mrnak.  This escape, in his telling, had been 
an act of high heroism, and he even threw into his story, for good 
measure, the death of Mrnak, who as later on came to light was safe 
and sound; and so, with the aid of the ultra-reactionary Novoye 
Vremya, he gained nationwide fame.”83   
 
Hence, instead of being court-martialled, Kornilov received a hero’s 
welcome.84  It was at this time that Kornilov attracted powerful political backers such 
as Rodzianko and Guchkov.85  In the aftermath of the February Revolution, Kornilov 
served as the commander of the Petrograd Garrison.  Yet, he was soon angered at the 
low level of discipline and upon his own request took the command of Eighth 
Army86.  Finally in early July, while mass demonstrations were taking place against 
Milyukov’s foreign policy, and the Germans threatening Russia, Kerensky, on the 
advice of Boris Savinkov87, promoted Kornilov to be the commander of South-
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Western Front and a few days later offered him the supreme command of the whole 
Russian Army.88   
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CHAPTER II 
2. THE KORNILOV AFFAIR 
2.1. The Summer of Discontent         
 Following the suppression of the July uprisings, the imprisonment of key 
Bolshevik leaders, and the appointment of General Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Russian army, it seemed as if the Provisional Government would survive 
through the following turbulent months.  Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky, without 
whom it becomes impossible to assess the Revolution, became the head of the 
government and reached the pinnacle of power.  In Boris Kolonitskii’s words, “He 
personally picked ‘the government of salvation of the revolution’, and the power of 
the head of the government was significantly increased.”89  However, this temporary 
political solidarity that existed in the pre-Kornilov Affair period vanished; leading to 
dire consequences, it foreshadowed the form of the October coup.  The Kornilov 
Affair paved the way for the Bolsheviks to take advantage of this new turmoil, which 
provoked serious doubts at the Provisional Government and therefore Kerensky.  
Indeed, the Kornilov Affair was the Prelude to Bolshevism.  While most right-
wingers, such as V.M. Purishkevich90 –quite justly- called Kerensky ‘the minister of 
civil war’, the government still tried to ‘harmonize the interests of landowners and 
peasants, workers and bosses, labor and capital’91. A British newspaper 
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correspondent later wrote, “The Kornilov Affair was the beginning of the end for 
what at this time could properly be called the Kerensky Government.”92   
Lenin argued that Kerensky attempted to revive the coalition when there was 
already no basis for it, to preach compromise to those who rejected it, and to prevent 
civil war when it had already become practically inevitable.  Although Russia was 
already in a state of turmoil and was slowly sliding towards civil war, the Kornilov 
affair is often considered as the last fatal blow to Kerensky’s cult and the new 
coalition.  Kerensky eventually found himself between strong criticism of the left and 
right wing; both of which regarded Kerensky as a traitor and the Kornilov affair as 
‘the final act of a tragic misunderstanding’.93  The Kornilov Affair, which made it 
possible for the Bolsheviks to heal the wounds of July, was one of the most ‘bizarre 
episodes in the Russian Revolution’.94  Hence it would be useful to bear in mind the 
nature of bilateral relations between the two camps of the dramatis personae, namely 
Kerensky and Kornilov, and the events that triggered the antagonism against both 
figures, leading to a Bolshevik triumph.   
 
2.1.1. Kornilov’s Appointment 
  Kornilov was a ‘fighting general’ with legendary valor; he disliked 
metropolitan areas and politicians as well.  Luckett describes the word ‘fighting 
tradition’ as “an emotive phrase, [which] conjured up the picture of a leader of men 
who was the antithesis of the desk-bound staff officer or bureaucrat, who would 
never hesitate to expose himself to danger, a hero in the sense of Skobelev”95.  
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Kornilov was just that type of heroic field officer, yet also the type of naïve figure 
who comes up with clear-cut solutions, such as machine gun methods rather than 
diplomatic intrigues.  The years Kornilov had spent on the battlefields sharpened his 
aspirations about revitalizing Russia’s combating forces and his perception of all 
politicians as schemers.  Likewise, this atmosphere of violence cemented Kornilov’s 
belief that force was a suitable response to disorder and subordination.  This belief 
played out when Kornilov marched on Petrograd.  Likewise, Kornilov’s immediate 
response to Kerensky’s call for help in July to seek to quell political unrest with 
military authority was positive.  Moreover one of his primary demands was the 
reintroduction of the death penalty within the ranks of the Russian army.  Thus, 
Kornilov’s early battlefield experiences were essential in determining his reactions to 
later political developments. 
Kerensky’s appointment of Kornilov to such a high rank, thereby placing so 
much military power in the hands of such a character, eventually provoked a deep 
curiosity at that time.  It should be borne in mind, however, that Kerensky often 
played the role of Hamlet in his term of influence, and quickly changed his decisions 
over crucial appointments.  In this case, Kerensky, possibly, thought that a change in 
the command of the army following the disastrous offensive might be imperative.  
After all, Brusilov, who “of all the old Tsarist Generals had gone farthest in his 
efforts to adapt himself to revolutionary phraseology”96, failed to restore the army’s 
combative forces.  Apparently, Kornilov, who was much younger than Brusilov, with 
his reputation of iron will and inexhaustible energy appeared to be a better 
alternative.  Moreover, Kerensky, after presiding in the Military Conference at 
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Stavka on July 29th wherein he listened to the impassionate speeches delivered by a 
number of old Generals, received a message from Kornilov, which stated that the 
major source of Russia’s problems depended on the ‘original and long-standing 
deficiency of the commanding staff’ and that the restoration of order in the army was 
essential; the message sounded to Kerensky progressive and liberal. 97 Certainly, 
Kerensky chose this young general because he proposed to use ‘Draconian methods’ 
to re-impose discipline in the Army instead of those proposed by the ‘Chicken’s 
Deputies.’98  
Boris Savinkov, on the other hand, was a valuable friend of Kerensky, and the 
Commissar of the Southwestern Front, who was now being selected as the active 
administrator of the War Ministry, of which the Premier himself was the nominal 
head.  He had a charismatic character and was probably more convincing than 
Kerensky.  When Somerset Maugham met him, during the pre-revolutionary years in 
Paris, he was fascinated by this former terrorist; “the archterrorist should have the 
prosperous look of a lawyer in a stand-up collar, a quiet tie with a pin in it, and a 
frock coat”, wrote Moynahan, “the British writer liked Savinkov for the endearing 
way he told him that ‘assassination is a business like any other, one gets accustomed 
to it.’”99 Winston Churchill, on the other hand, who met Savinkov briefly, considered 
him a ‘Russian Bonaparte’ and ‘one of the most interesting men alive’.100  Savinkov 
was politically much closer to the reactionary general while owing his position to 
Kerensky, and thus tried to keep a foot on both camps.  Savinkov believed that if 
Kornilov’s military genius were united with Kerensky’s political abilities, the 
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revolution’s aspirations would be fulfilled101.  Likewise, he very well knew the core 
distinction between both camps; that for Kornilov, Russia came first before the 
revolution itself, whereas for Kerensky, it was the otherwise.  Nevertheless, no one 
would have suited to Savinkov’s position as an intermediary better than him102.  A 
stronger and more determined character than Kerensky, Savinkov wholeheartedly 
believed that order and discipline in the army should immediately be restored and 
that General Kornilov, given the necessary political assistance, could be a useful 
means towards this end.103                
Kornilov, however, was not willing to be a mere pawn in Kerensky’s war 
machine.  Certainly, as Pipes puts it, “Kornilov was a patriot, ready to serve any 
government that advanced Russia’s national interests, especially in time of war, by 
maintaining whatsoever was necessary to win victory” 104, but he did not believe 
Kerensky had the required strength to lead Russia to victory.  Therefore, Kornilov 
did not rush to accept the proposal.  His reasons were that it would not be rational to 
conduct military operations against the German offensive without taking appropriate 
political measures that would restore order.  On this point, Denikin recalls the third 
day of the Stavka Conference when a series of telegrams were wired by Kornilov to 
the Provisional Government and when the General made himself clear on his 
demands; “I declare that if the Government does not confirm the measures proposed 
by me, and deprives me of the only means of saving the army and of using it for its 
real purpose of defending the Motherland and liberty, then I, General Kornilov, will 
of my own accord lay down my authority as Commander-in-Chief…”105.  Although 
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both Kornilov and Kerensky had the same goal – to revitalize Russia’s combative 
forces – they had major disagreements over its implementation.  In Chamberlin’s 
words,  
“Had Kerensky been a revolutionary of the uncompromising type 
and had Kornilov been an out-and-out monarchist, anxious to replace 
the Romanovs on the throne, the appointment of the latter would 
never have taken place, or at least the irrepressible conflict between 
the two men would have burst out much sooner than it actually did.  
But as a matter of fact the desires and objectives of the Socialist 
Revolutionary Premier and of the Cossack General ran along parallel 
lines to a certain extent.”106   
 
Indeed, Kerensky, no less than Kornilov, had the desire to see an army wherein 
discipline and order remained unchallenged.  As for Kornilov, he had no desire to set 
up a monarchy.  Hence the often confused and contradictory period, which resulted 
in Kornilov’s open defiance of the Provisional Government, is only explicable on the 
assumption that ‘Kerensky probably always had at least something of a premonition 
that by destroying Kornilov he would be simultaneously cutting the ground from 
beneath his own feet’107. 
Having experienced the main source of setbacks in the Tsarist army, 
Kornilov’s main ambition was to regenerate Russia’s armed forces by taking certain 
precautions – promulgation of a number of laws by the Provisional Government.  
With this in mind he revealed the following conditions on which he would be willing 
to accept Kerensky’s offer and ‘lead the nation to victory and to the prospect of a just 
and honorable peace’.108  The message concluded that, “I accept this appointment 
upon the following terms: (I) responsibility only before my conscience and before 
the whole people; (II) absolute non-interference with my military orders, including 
appointments to the high command; (III) extension of all measures lately adopted at 
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the front to all districts in the rear where there are army reserves; (IV) acceptance of 
my proposals stated in my telegram to the Generalissimo at the Conference at the 
Stavka…”109.  Even General Denikin, who was a close friend of Kornilov and the 
future leader of the White Movement, mentions that the first of these demands would 
create “a form of sovereignty of the Supreme Command that would have been very 
original, from the standpoint of state law”.110 In Denikin’s words,   
“I waited impatiently for the official reply…on receiving Kornilov’s 
ultimatum, the Council of the Government hotly debated the matter 
and Kerensky demanded that the prestige of the High Command 
should be upheld by the immediate removal of the new Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief.  The Government did not agree to this, and 
Kerensky, ignoring the other points mentioned in the telegram, 
replied only to the second, by recognizing the right of the Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief to select his own direct assistants.”111 
 
Although Kerensky was initially tempered by this ultimatum, he actually 
considered the language of these demands an indication of Kornilov’s naïveté in 
political matters; “At that time I could have entirely shared Prince Trubetzkoy’s later 
expressed opinion of Kornilov: ‘My general opinion of Kornilov’ wrote Prince 
Trubetzkoy, ‘is that he is above all a soldier unable to grasp complicated political 
matters, and as such he offers a particularly remarkable sample of our commanding 
staff’.”112 Indeed, Kerensky thought that Kornilov was apparently lacking necessary 
diplomatic qualifications for a man of his position.  Even his colleague General 
Alexeev reckoned Kornilov a ‘politically illiterate general’ and to have ‘the heart of a 
lion and the brain of a sheep’.113   
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Nonetheless, Kerensky shared the same goals as Kornilov – restoration of law 
and order in the country.  Moreover, Kerensky was well intentioned yet timid while 
taking the necessary steps, such as the reintroduction of capital punishment, for he 
feared a Soviet unrest, which would jeopardize his position.  After all, in the midst of 
the ambiguity over the nomination of Kornilov, a man of unsuitable political 
motives, to a post wherein his aspirations of dictatorship would certainly sharpen, 
“Kerensky made Kornilov the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who under the old 
regime could rise no higher than a divisional commander and who had become 
discredited in the eyes of the revolutionary circles after commanding the garrison in 
Petrograd.”114 James White wrote, “Why should Kerensky come to appoint this 
military mediocrity to such a position of power when he must have known that 
Kornilov was politically unsuitable.”115      
Besides, it would be most appropriate to note here that, the appointment of 
General Kornilov as the supreme commander was a risk worth taking for Kerensky.  
Not only was he the only option to restore order but also the most-influential person 
to whom a great majority of soldiers were loyal116.  In Kerensky’s words,  
“The decision to exercise actively the extensive rights of a military 
commander, the daring to act without fear of responsibility, without 
hiding behind another’s back – these were the qualities most needed 
at the time.  Unfortunately, these qualities were seldom to be found 
among our higher army command…Therefore it is obvious why I 
promptly and decidedly promoted General Kornilov, in spite of the 
original ‘ultimative’ methods of his activity…(Besides) If we recall 
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the whole military-political situation at the beginning of July 1917, it 
becomes obvious that the substance of General Kornilov’s 
‘demands’ was by no means an America discovered by him, but a 
somewhat peculiar formula applied by him to the measures partly 
passed, partly planned by the Provisional Government and fully 
corresponding to the frame of mind of all responsible democratic and 
liberal circles.”117    
 
Finally when Kornilov demanded a purge of the Higher Command, implying that 
the disaster was not necessarily the fault of the soldiers, Kerensky said, “Such a 
view tended to produce the impression that here was a man with a deeper and wider 
outlook upon the situation than that of his compeers.”118 
 
2.1.2. The Split between Kerensky and Kornilov 
 
Kornilov’s appointment as C-in-C of the Russian Army is important, for it 
marks the beginning of the disagreement between the Premier and the Generalissimo.  
As Maxim Gorky explained, when the Government refused to implement Kornilov’s 
plan immediately, he acted vigorously in his own area.  On July 21, Kornilov ordered 
all commanders subordinate to him to turn machine guns and artillery on all units 
which abandoned their positions without permission.119 By doing so, he tried to 
establish a reputation “as a stern disciplinarian, who, when necessary, was willing to 
act independently.”120 
Upon his appointment as Commander in Chief of the Russian army, Kornilov 
ordered General Alexander Krymov to move his troops from Romania to Mogilev 
and gradually developed Mogilev as the headquarters of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, which 
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included two Cossack divisions and the Savage Division.121  Mogilev is a site 
equidistant from the Gulf of Riga and Petrograd.  The precise point where the troops 
were concentrated was within the triangle of Nevel, Novosokolniki, and Velikie Luki.  
The development of a potent military force in this region became an important cause 
of friction between Kerensky and Kornilov.  Kornilov perceived Mogilev as an ideal 
location for mobilizing troops unhindered to either north or southwest and stated that 
“he wanted a reserve to deal with the possibility of a fresh Bolshevik coup in either 
city.  If that happened, he intended to wipe out the Leninists ‘root and branch’, 
whether the government approved or not.”122  Kornilov said that, 
“It’s time to hang the German supporters and their spies…with 
Lenin at their head and to disperse the Soviet of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Deputies so that it would never reassemble.  You are right.  
I am shifting the cavalry corps mainly so as to bring it up to 
Petrograd by the end of August and, if a demonstration of the 
Bolsheviki takes place, to deal with those traitors as they deserve.  I 
want to commit the leadership of this operation to General Krymov.  
I am convinced that he will not hesitate, in any case of necessity, to 
hang every member of the Soviet.”123   
 
Kerensky and many other Soviets, however, worried that Mogilev had been chosen 
for other reasons, namely as a launching point for an offensive against Petrograd.  
The latter’s assessment is justifiable in the sense that the real German threat was 
from the north against Riga, not the south.  Additionally, there was virtually nothing 
between Petrograd and Mogilev to check the advance of a hostile army.   
Already questioned by the Soviets as to the threatening location of the 3rd 
Cavalry Corps, Kerensky did not seem to credit his new Commander in Chief’s 
military decisions.  Although, Kornilov repeatedly asserted his loyalty to the 
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Provisional Government, he was becoming the focal point of right wing supporters – 
a point on which the polarization between Kerensky and Kornilov is concentrated.  
As Wildman puts it, “Kornilov was instantaneously transformed into a figure 
representing the hopes of a resurgent right, overshadowing the Provisional 
Government, now perceived to be weak and vacillating.  Kerensky by this risky step 
[appointment of Kornilov] was deprived of enhanced prestige when he became 
Minister President of a new coalition government on July 23rd.”124 Likewise, Harvey 
Ascher suggests that when Kornilov refused to approve Kerensky’s appointment of 
General VA. Cheremisov as C-in-C of the southwestern front, Kerensky retreated 
and appointed Kornilov’s candidate P.S. Baluev, signaling another weakness of the 
Provisional Government.  “Kornilov’s image as a ‘strong man’ was further enhanced 
as a result of this, in the wake of the July defeats.”125  
James White argues: “The element common to all the groups and 
organizations supporting the Kornilovist movement was the military.  This element 
welded together all the dissimilar components whose common purpose was the 
establishment of a military dictatorship.  The General Headquarters at Mogilev 
became a place of pilgrimage for members of numerous right-wing societies and a 
hotbed of conspiracy among the officers.”126  This suggestion might partly be 
justified for most officers sympathized with the military aims of Kornilov and gave 
him support.  The most notable one was General Lukomsky, who was Kornilov’s 
Chief of Staff.127    However, neither Kornilov nor Lukomsky and other Kornilovists 
held meetings in Mogilev with the intention of building a plot.  The chief 
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conspiratorial military organization was the Army and Fleet Officers’ Union, most 
active members of which were Lieutenant-Colonels Lebedev and Pronin.128         
Due to the meteoric rise in Kornilov’s celebrity the rivalry between Kerensky 
and the General intensified.  In the words of General Denikin, “Kornilov became a 
banner, for some of counterrevolution, for others of the salvation of the 
motherland.”129  Meanwhile, The Union of Knights of St. George and the Union of 
Officers hastened to associate themselves with Kornilov.  Moreover, a group of 
public men in Moscow wired him a telegram under the signature of Rodzianko, 
declaring that, “In this threatening hour of heavy trial all thinking Russia looks to 
you with hope and faith.”130  Another reason behind Kornilov’s increasing reputation 
was his invitations to top-ranking officers and politicians – a majority of whom were 
right-wing supporters - to Mogilev in order to acquaint them with the formidable 
condition of the army.  This was the same concern that had led Savinkov to submit 
papers concerning the Moscow State Conference Program to be signed by Kerensky 
– as he promised to do and committing him to reintroduce specific measures.  
Savinkov, having consulted Kornilov in early August, drafted a four-fold program, 
which called for the introduction of death penalty in the rear, militarization of 
railroads, implementation of martial law in war industry plants, and the return of 
military discipline forces to officers from army committees.131  Yet, once more, 
Kerensky showed reluctance in issuing these necessary documents in order not to 
alienate the groups which would support him in the Moscow conference – Savinkov 
railed at the cowardice of this “narcissistic women’s premier”132.  According to 
Savinkov, although Kerensky promised earlier to sign the program document, he 
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“kept on procrastinating and on August 8th said that he would never, under any 
circumstances, sign a bill on the death penalty in the rear.”133   
Kornilov, on the other hand, began to exercise his authority independent from 
the Provisional Government.  When General Kornilov’s command to restore order 
and discipline on the front lines of the demoralized armies was finally carried out 
Viktor Manakin, who was a colonel on the Southwest front under Kornilov’s term of 
command, wrote: “The effect of the initial actions by the shock-battalions was 
overwhelming.  The news of the executions spread over the front like wildfire, and, 
along the entire front soldiers, who only yesterday had been killing their officers, 
started to salute all officers.  This was a phenomenon totally unheard of since the 
issuance of Order No. 1.  The psychological moment for restoring the front was at 
hand.  Unfortunately, there was no longer any civil authority to clinch the matter.”134 
In the meantime, the military situation was becoming even more desperate.  
The Germans, aware of the approaching autumn and the imminent harsh winter that 
would hinder an efficient campaign, had begun to advance up the Baltic coast.  In 
order to stop the German offensive, the Russians installed forces in the Gulf of Riga:  
a possible Russian defeat in Riga would help the Germans march straight to the 
capital.  The French diplomat Louis de Robien, who witnessed the Revolutions of 
1917, wrote in his memoirs that, 
“Russian troops are retreating and running away everywhere.  
Nobody knows where they will stop.  ‘On the Volga’ General 
Polovtsov said to Chambrun.  I am well aware that he is apt to look 
on the dark side of things, because he was sacked after the recent 
events…But the Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, is hardly 
more optimistic.  In fact he declared in a published letter that it was 
                                                 
133 Pipes, The Russian Revolutions…, p.443. 
134 Viktor Manakin, ‘The Shock-Battalions of 1917: Reminiscences’ Russian Review Vol.14, No.3 
(Jul., 1955), 214-232  
 50 
useless to think of launching an offensive before the end of 
September (?!), and that the whole army must be brought back.”135  
 
On the other hand, rumors of Kerensky’s dismissal of Kornilov were spreading like 
wildfire.  Within this fractious atmosphere, Kornilov received reliable information 
regarding a possible Bolshevik attempt to assassinate him.  He immediately set off 
with the “Tekintzy” division armed with machine guns to negotiate the terms of 
Savinkov’s proposals with Kerensky on his own turf, the Winter Palace in Petrograd.  
Kerensky was eventually insulted at Kornilov’s regiment’s waiting outside his 
residence and notified the general that further evaluation should be made within the 
Moscow Conference.  Despite Kornilov’s repeated warnings of an expected German 
offensive on Riga, and the necessity for militarization of railways, Kerensky hoped 
that the Conference in Moscow would be ‘a last attempt to save Russia, to broaden 
the crumbling base of his regime, and stamp some unity on the state.’ 
 Kornilov, however, was not willing to give up.  Aware of the fact that the 
Germans would soon resume their offensive, and led by his growing impatience, 
Kornilov requested another chance to meet the cabinet.  On August 3, he once more 
hurried to the capital and began addressing the cabinet members about the fragile 
conditions at the front.  While he was discussing the much needed military reforms, 
Savinkov interrupted and warned him quietly not to disclose too much.  A few 
minutes later, another pause was witnessed when a similar warning came from 
Kerensky.  As Kornilov quickly interpreted matters, both Savinkov and Kerensky 
were afraid that one or more ministers in the cabinet were leaking information to the 
Soviets.  From that meeting on, Kornilov had lost his already weak belief in the 
government and regarded it as unworthy to lead the nation; he was to refer time and 
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again to what he had experienced in that meeting as justification for his subsequent 
actions.136  
 Actually, Kerensky, since the very day he had taken office, had tried to 
bridge the gap between the Soviet and the Provisional Government through pursuing 
the war effort, thus, receiving the support of the latter, while conceding to the Soviet 
the right to veto legislation.  However, the badgering of his new Commander-in-
Chief compelled him to choose between the left and the right, “between the interests 
of international socialism and those of the Russian State” – a choice he always 
wished to avoid.137  Kerensky very well knew that granting Kornilov the right to 
implement capital punishment would entail a split with the hard-earned Soviet 
support.  Indeed, on August 18, a Bolshevik motion in the Soviet meeting for voting 
on the long-debated death penalty issue resulted in the Soviet’s unanimous decision 
to reject capital punishment at the front as a “measure intended to frighten the soldier 
masses for the purpose of enslaving them to the command staff”138.  The decision 
was a crystal clear indication that Kerensky had no chance of approving Kornilov’s 
demands, a majority of which he thought reasonable.  Richard Pipes argues that,  
“In theory, Kerensky could have stood up to the Soviet and cast his 
lot with the liberals and conservatives.  But that alternative was 
foreclosed for him by the very low esteem in which he was held by 
these circles, especially after the failure of the June offensive and his 
indecisive reaction to the July putsch.  When he made an appearance 
at the Moscow State Conference on August 14, he was acclaimed by 
the left only: the right received him in stony silence, reserving its 
ovation for Kornilov…He had no choice, therefore, but to opt for the 
left.”139  
  
Likewise, observing the increasing friction between the Premier and the 
General, Louis de Robien wrote further in his memoirs that  “The internal situation is 
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still far from brilliant…one has the feeling that there is increasing disagreement 
between Kerensky and Kornilov, and that the extremist parties are taking advantage 
of it to gain ground.”140  At this point, Kerensky’s major fault was to perceive 
Kornilov as the center of anti-democratic factions and consider the Right as the only 
element that posed a threat to democratic Russia.  Even though Kerensky witnessed 
the armed demonstrations of the Bolsheviks in April, June, and July and expected 
future ones, he convinced himself that the real danger was from the right wing.  
Domestic affairs in the wake of the Moscow State Conference marked the closing 
doom for both Kornilov and Kerensky.  In Sukhanov’s words, 
“In general, towards the date of the Moscow State Conference, a 
little over a month after the July Days, it was already quite clear that 
the movement of the popular masses had resumed its former course.  
The Third Coalition, like the other one before it, was hanging in the 
air.  The Menshevik – SR Soviet was being followed by quite 
compact groups of burgherdom, but not by the masses of the workers 
and soldiers.  The rank-and-file of the people as before were turning 
their eyes to the Bolsheviks alone – while Tsereteli and his friends 
came before bourgeois-landlord Russia and proletarian Europe in the 
name of ‘the whole democracy’.141   
 
2.2. The Last Blow to the Provisional Government 
 
 The very rationale behind the summoning of the Moscow State 
Conference142, which was held in the Bolshoi Theatre on August 12 - 13, was to feel 
the pulse of the nation and to bring together the divergent right and left wing groups 
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to create a unified revolutionary program143.  However, just as it seemed crystal clear 
from the opening sessions of the conference, the latter meetings brought 
irreconcilable bi-polarization between the Soviets and the right wing groups. “The 
scene was reminiscent of the opening of the Duma in 1906”, as Orlando Figes 
describes, “The two Russias had not moved any closer in the intervening years.  The 
Bolsheviks had decided to boycott the conference and called a city-wide strike.  The 
trams did not run and restaurants and cafes were closed, including the theatre’s own 
buffet, so the delegates had to serve their own refreshments.”144  The seating plan of 
the conference hall exactly mirrored the polarization; on the right side sat the middle-
class parties, the bankers, industrialists and Duma representatives; while on the left 
were the Soviet delegates.  Kerensky’s path to the realization of Russia’s unified 
interests was, thus, closed inasmuch as he leaned towards the left; while the Soviets 
cheered and clapped during his speech, the liberals and right wing groups were dead 
silent.  Obviously, his wavering reaction against the July putsch was the major factor 
that caused the friction between him and the liberals as well as conservatives145.  Sir 
George Buchanan, who was the British ambassador to Petrograd between 1910 – 
1918, wrote in his diary that, 
“Kerensky…has personally lost ground, and he made a distinctly bad 
impression by the way in which he presided over the conference and 
by the autocratic tone of his speeches.  According to all accounts, he 
was very nervous; but whether this was due to overstrain or to the 
rivalry which undoubtedly exists between him and Kornilov it is 
difficult to say.  Kornilov is a much stronger man than Kerensky, 
and were he to assert his influence over the army and were the latter 
to become a strong fighting force he would be master of the 
situation.  I hear from several sources that Kerensky did his best to 
prevent Kornilov addressing the conference, and thought he has been 
obliged by the force of circumstances to accede to all the general’s 
demands, he evidently regards him as a dangerous rival…There is 
little love, I imagine, lost between the two men, but our chief 
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safeguard lies in the fact that, for the moment at any rate, neither can 
get on without the other.  Kerensky cannot hope to retrieve the 
military situation without Kornilov; while Kornilov cannot dispense 
with Kerensky, who, in spite of his waning popularity, is the man 
best fitted to appeal the masses…”146 
   
Kornilov, on the other hand, was welcomed with an enthusiastic crowd, 
accompanied by the Cossack soldiers and soldiers of the Petrograd Artillery School.  
“Middle-class ladies pelted him with flowers at the Alexandrovsky Station.  
Countess Morozova fell on her knees before him, while the Kadet, Rodichev, called 
on him to ‘Save Russia and a thankful people will crown you.’147  During his rather 
dry speech, he reasserted his observations on the Russian army, called for the 
creation of an army of iron discipline, and criticized the futile efforts of the 
Provisional Government; “…I believe that there should be no difference between the 
front and the rear in terms of the severity of those measures necessary to save the 
country” said Kornilov with frustration.148  It was only when the Generalissimo 
addressed the conference that his program reached a wider audience; he even 
attracted some Allied support and sympathy.  “In the case of Britain, this extended to 
finance and the use of a British squadron” wrote Lionel Kochan,  
“A leading Petrograd banker, a friend of the ambassador, made 
Buchanan privy to the maturing plot at the end of August.  Buchanan 
decided not to denounce the plot and wisely urged the plotters to 
renounce an enterprise that was not only doomed to failure but so 
easily exploitable by the Bolsheviks.  ‘If General Kornilov were 
wise’ Buchanan told his banker friend, ‘he would wait for the 
Bolsheviks to make the first move and then come and put them 
down’.”149  
       
Following his speech at the Conference, General Kornilov wrote “I thought it 
essential to make known to the country the real state of affairs in its armed forces, 
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and to point out how necessary it was to raise their battle worthiness.” 150 General 
Lukomsky, recollected in his memoirs that Kornilov approached him after his speech 
and said “I have no personal ambition. I only wish to save Russia and will gladly 
submit to a strong Provisional Government.”151 The Prime Minister’s speech, on the 
other hand, was grotesque.  He gave an extremely long speech, in which he lost his 
way and the audience as well.  At one point Kerensky halted for breath and his 
supporters burst into applause as if they were trying to end his misery. The 
conference was over, and Kerensky quietly sat - He could not finish his sentence.152   
While the presence of General Kornilov was the only factor that saved the 
Moscow State Conference from oblivion, it was dismissed with no practical 
legislation made for the amelioration of the army’s condition, and clashing views 
between both camps tormented a much better environment for plots.  “The Moscow 
Conference marked Kerensky’s moral downfall” as Figes argues, “The two months 
between it and the Bolshevik seizure of power were really no more than a long death 
agony of the Provisional Government”153 Likewise, Chamberlin asserts that “The 
State Conference was conceived as a rallying point of national unity. Its failure in 
this respect was dismal and complete.  Not only were the considerable masses of 
workers and soldiers who were already following the banner of Bolshevism outside 
its pale; but from the very moment of its opening the participants split into two 
hostile and irreconcilable camps.”154   
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2.2.1. The Mounting Conspiracy 
Following the Moscow Conference, the anticipated German assault on Riga 
was launched and, as Kornilov had foreseen before, the disorderly Russian army 
retreated from the Gulf of Riga.  While Kornilov thought that such an experience 
would alarm the Provisional Government into taking the necessary measures 
immediately, Kerensky was planning ways to take advantage of this situation and to 
legitimize the dismissal of his rival.  The German defeat, Kerensky thought, would 
provide him the very opportunity to disarm his rival without provoking the rightwing 
factions.   
On the other hand, Savinkov received reliable information from the French 
Intelligence, regarding another planned Bolshevik coup for the beginning of 
September.155  This particular piece of information served as an instrument for 
Kerensky’s plot as well.  The information gathered indicated that the time of the all-
out Bolshevik putsch would coincide with the expected German offensive from Riga 
to Petrograd.  Kerensky, cunningly, sent Savinkov to transmit his plans against the 
Bolshevik putsch to Kornilov; he actually was thinking of using this putsch as 
another excuse to disarm the general.     
Savinkov was presumably misinformed about Kerensky’s conspiracy, and 
served as an intermediary between the General and the Prime Minister; he thus went 
to Mogilev to negotiate the terms of Kerensky’s plan with Kornilov.  Kerensky’s 
demands seemed flattering at first sight and pleased the General, since Kornilov 
himself sought to carry out a similar plan.  Kerensky’s demands were as follows; (1) 
In order to practice an unhindered plan the General was required to send the Union of 
Officers to Moscow since a certain number of people among this group were 
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suspected of participating in a conspiracy; (2) For these reasons, the general was 
required to liquidate the political department attached to Stavka; (3) The general was 
further required to send a cavalry corps to Petrograd -this was to be the 3rd. Cavalry 
Corps- to be under the command of the government.156 However, the Prime Minister 
specifically asked the general not to send the Savage Division, and not to appoint 
Krymov to lead them; apparently Kerensky thought that this particular division and 
commander were especially loyal to the General.  The third task is particularly 
important because Kerensky’s subsequent accusations were such that Kornilov had 
sent these troops to overthrow his government.  In Kerensky’s words, 
“The story of the 3rd Corps’ march on Petrograd, led by General 
Krymov, throws important light on the question whether General 
Kornilov’s rebellion was a ‘misunderstanding’ caused by my 
‘provocation’ as it is termed in Kornilov’s address to the Russian 
people, or whether it was a premeditated crime.  I shall record a few 
facts which will solve this question, without as yet drawing any 
conclusions therefrom…On August 24th Savinkov left the 
Headquarters, having secured (according to his statement) General 
Kornilov’s consent ‘to send a cavalry corps, not to appoint General 
Krymov as its commander, and to replace the native division by a 
regular cavalry division.”157   
 
Kerensky concludes by arguing that Kornilov did not abide by his earlier promises 
and charges him with treason.   
Bearing further mind the message General Denikin had received on 
September 2 from the Commander-in-Chief, one would eventually sense that 
Kerensky’s plan worked out; “According to reliable information, a rising of the 
Bolsheviks will take place at the end of August.  By this time the Third Cavalry 
Corps, commanded by Krymov, would reach Petrograd, would crush the rising, and 
simultaneously put an end to the Soviets”158.  Nevertheless, one would sense that 
Kerensky’s main purpose of demanding the 3rd Cavalry Corps was not only to be 
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militarily independent of the general, but also to use this action for charging the 
general with treachery – with an attempted coup159.  Other than the 3rd Cavalry 
Corps’ march on Petrograd, and the simultaneous declaration of the martial law 
within the outlying districts, the parties had reached a consensus on designating a 
pre-existent secret organization in Petrograd to control and protect key areas from the 
Bolsheviks, such as communication offices, stations, and ministries.  Amidst 
growing rumors, prompted by the Soviets, about the organization’s structure, 
Kerensky’s decision to lead them with 100 select officers from his regiment in their 
attempt later jeopardized his stance.  The secret organization’s attempt was described 
as an attempted coup by an army of two thousand officers.  Kerensky’s plot was now 
ready. 
As Pipes argues, it is often difficult for historians to penetrate the minds of 
individuals by mere observation of their actions; yet the developments following the 
State Conference in Moscow make it hard to escape the conclusion that Kornilov was 
unable to see through Kerensky’s deception – that the message carried by Savinkov 
on Kerensky’s order actually targeted not the Bolsheviki but himself.  By the end of 
the negotiations in Mogilev, Kornilov reassured Savinkov that he reckoned 
Kerensky, despite all his faults, to be a patriot and that Russia needed him.  The 
message wired to Krymov from the Headquarters summed up the commander’s 
instructions: 
“1. In the event you receive from me or directly on the spot 
information that the Bolshevik uprising has begun, you are to move 
without delay with the corps to Petrograd, occupy the city, and 
disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which have joined the 
Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd and 
disperse the Soviet. 
2. Having carried out this mission, General Krymov is to detach one 
brigade with artillery to Oranienbaum; following the arrival there, he 
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is to demand of the Kronshtadt garrison to disarm the fortress and 
relocate to the mainland.” 160          
 
 The two assignments indicated that Kornilov implemented Kerensky’s orders.  
The Cavalry Corps were dispatched to Petrograd, in line with Kerensky’s first 
demand, and the disarmament of Kronshtadt, the second instruction which was never 
carried out.  Kornilov’s both orders reflected his aspirations of the protection of the 
Provisional Government from the Bolsheviks.  Contrary to Kerensky’s accusations of 
insubordination, Kornilov might be justified in appointing Krymov as the 
commander of the Third Cavalry Corps for he explained to Lukomsky that “the 
government feared Krymov would be too harsh in dealing with the rebels, but it 
would be grateful to him when it was all over.”161  
If Kornilov’s favorite mistake was to trust the loyalty of his soldiers more 
than necessary, the other was to trust Kerensky’s envoys and sometimes even agent 
provocateurs.  Although the “comedy of errors with the most tragic consequences”162 
had already been experienced in the brief span following the Moscow State 
Conference, the most mysterious, and peculiar one had not yet come to pass.  The 
Procurator of the Holy Synod, a self-appointed envoy and a flamboyantly corrupt 
figure, V.N. Lvov163 (not to be confused with the former Prime Minister, Prince G. 
E. Lvov), offered Kerensky collaboration free of charge.  Vladimir Nikolayevich 
Lvov was a forty-five year old man, from a well-off landowning family, a man of 
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“burning ambitions but no commensurate talents”164, and a consciously malevolent 
figure who had a minor amusement in editing the contents of the messages he had 
been asked to deliver; such as Kornilov proposes would be Kornilov demands – a 
phrase that could barely enhance mutual negotiations165.   
After presenting himself as a mere patriot who was backed by a substantial 
amount of support, Lvov told Kerensky that the Provisional Government was losing 
its legitimacy in the eyes of both right and left wing followers.  He further advised 
the Prime Minister not to exclude certain elements in his plans for the sake of 
advancement of Russia – For Lvov, Kadets and even more moderate groups should 
be taken into consideration.  Although, Kerensky was not astonished by Lvov’s ideas 
since they were not quite unique notions Kerensky thought that Lvov would be a 
suitable instrument for his interests and therefore should not be waived aside.  
Interestingly, although Lvov fell far beyond Kerensky’s sphere of influence and 
conviction, he was sent for subsequent negotiations with the General in Mogilev.  
Pipes argues that “there is no reason to doubt Kerensky, but it is not improbable that, 
consciously or not, he gave Lvov the impression that he wished to know more, using 
him, if not as a proxy, then as an intelligence agent to learn whether there was any 
substance to persistent rumors of anti-government plots in Mogilev.”166 
To Kornilov’s surprise, Lvov came up with a rather bizarre proposal to the 
general.  Even though Kornilov seconded all the suggestions concerning the 
suppression of a counter-revolutionary attempt, Kerensky now appointed another 
envoy to present a different deal.  Even so, the Generalissimo agreed to have a word 
with him.  “Although Kerensky had not given me specific authority to conduct 
negotiations with Kornilov” Lvov later recalled, “I felt that I could negotiate in his 
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name inasmuch as, in general, he was agreeable to the reorganization of the 
government.”167  Although it is quite ambiguous what Lvov precisely offered the 
general, under Kerensky’s title, it is known that Lvov manipulated Kornilov’s 
dictatorial tendencies, and Kerensky’s obsessive fear of counter-revolution.  Finally, 
Lvov asked Kornilov’s views on how to assure firm government in Russia and told 
him that the Premier wanted to know which of the following proposals the General 
would consider more apt; “(1) Organization of a new government with himself as a 
dictator; (2) A new government invested with unlimited powers and consisting of 
three or five members, one of whom would be Kornilov; (3) Kornilov as a dictator 
and a Supreme Commander at the head of a new government.”168 Interpreting Lvov 
to mean that Kerensky was offering him dictatorial powers, Kornilov replied that he 
would be more willing to accept the third proposal, and said that “He did not crave 
power…and would subordinate himself to every head of state; but if asked to take on 
the main responsibility, as Lvov (and presumably the Prime Minister) suggested he 
might, he would not refuse.”169     
Following the talks at Mogilev, Lvov rushed backed to Petrograd, to the 
Winter Palace.  Without telling Kerensky that he asked Kornilov’s opinion on three 
options, he straightforwardly said that the Generalissimo demanded dictatorial 
authority.  “At first I burst out laughing. ‘Don’t joke V.N.’ I said” wrote Kerensky in 
his book on the Kornilov Affair,  
“This is no time to joke; the situation is very serious, Lvov 
answered…I did not hesitate for an instant in acting.  I rather felt 
than understood the extraordinary seriousness of the situation, if…if 
only Lvov’s words were even remotely in accord with reality…I 
began to explain to Lvov that I could not convey such a 
communication to the Provisional Government without proofs…At 
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last I asked him to put into writing all Kornilov’s points…Here is the 
text of the note Lvov wrote: 
 
General Kornilov proposes- 
(1) That martial law shall be proclaimed in Petrograd. 
(2) That all military and civil authority shall be placed in the hands of 
the Generalissimo. 
(3) That all ministers, not excluding the Premier, shall resign, and that 
the temporary executive power shall be transferred to the Assistant 
Ministers till the formation of a Cabinet by the Generalissimo. 
 
Petrograd, August 26, 1917”170  
 
Having received the tainted briefing from his envoy, Kerensky might have asked 
himself why the General employed Lvov as a messenger rather than Savinkov, or 
better yet, he might have rushed to the nearest telegraph to ask Kornilov whether he 
indeed commissioned Lvov to negotiate on his behalf.  Kerensky did neither.   
Kerensky, however, called the general to confirm their conversation and to 
obtain incontrovertible proof of Kornilov’s conspiracy; “He hoped, he said later, with 
this deception to obtain either a confirmation of Lvov’s ultimatum or else a 
bewildered denial.”171 Here is the full conversation by the Hughes Tape Machine of 
the Prime Minister with the Commander-in-Chief, 
Kerensky: “Good Day, General.  V.N. Lvov and Kerensky at the 
apparatus.  We beg you to confirm the statement that Kerensky is to 
act according to the communication made to him by Vladimir 
Nikolayevich.” 
Kornilov: “How do you do, Alexander Fedorovich.  How do you do 
Vladimir Nikolayevich.  Confirming once again the outline of the 
situation I believe the country and the army are in, an outline which I 
sketched out to Vladimir Nikolayevich with the request that he 
should report it to you, let me declare once more that the events of 
the last few days and those already in the offing make it imperative 
to reach a completely definite decision in the shortest time possible.” 
Kerensky (impersonating Lvov): “I, Vladimir Nikolayevich, am 
enquiring about this definite decision, which has to be taken, of 
which you asked me to inform A.F. strictly in private.  Without such 
confirmation from you personally, A.F. hesitates to trust me 
completely. 
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Kornilov: Yes, I confirm that I asked you to transmit my urgent 
request to A.F. to come to Mogilev.” 
Kerensky: “I, A.F., take your reply to confirm the words reported to 
me by V.N. It is impossible for me to do that and leave here today, 
but I hope to leave tomorrow.  Will Savinkov be needed?” 
Kornilov: “I urgently request that Boris Viktorovich come along 
with you.  What I said to V.N. equally applies to B.V. I would beg 
you most sincerely not to put off your departure later than to-
morrow.  Believe me the responsibility of the moment urges me to 
persist in my request.” 
Kerensky: “Shall we come only in case of an outbreak, of which 
there are rumors, or in any case?” 
Kornilov: “In any Case” 
Kerensky: “Good Day.  We shall meet soon.” 
Kornilov: “Good Day”  172    
  
Kerensky was now convinced that the General had dictatorial intentions and 
that he had “affirmed not only Lvov’s authority to speak in Kornilov’s name, but 
confirmed also the accuracy of the words which Lvov had attributed to him”173.  
Kerensky, due to his ‘fevered imagination’, interpreted Kornilov’s confirmation to 
mean that Kornilov will arrest him.  Yet, bearing in mind the Hughes Tape 
Recordings, one would sense that Kerensky never stated what he was asking and 
Kornilov never knew what he was responding.  As Richard Pipes argues, “The best 
that can be said in defense of the Prime Minister’s behavior is that he was 
overwrought.  But the suspicion lurks that he heard exactly what he wanted to 
hear.”174  
At the meantime, unaware of Kerensky’s misperception of their previous 
conversation, Kornilov began preparing for the suppression of the expected 
Bolshevik uprising.  To this end he cabled a message to Savinkov stating that “The 
corps is assembling in the environs of Petrograd toward evening August 28.  Request 
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that Petrograd be placed under martial law August 29.”175  The telegraph in concern 
should have cleared up the Government’s concerns about Kornilov’s alleged coup; 
“for surely if he were ordering the Third Corps to Petrograd to unseat the 
government, he would hardly have forewarned the government by telegraph.  It is 
even less credible that he would have entrusted his alleged coup to a subordinate.”176  
As Pipes further points out, reconsidering the ambiguity of the Kornilov Affair, one 
might hitherto ask oneself the obvious question: “How was it that Kornilov sent his 
troops while he himself sat quietly at headquarters?”177   
He had transmitted an ultimatum to Mogilev, ordering Kornilov to transfer 
the Supreme Command to General Lukomsky and without waiting for the latter’s 
arrival to proceed to Petrograd.  The immediate reply of General Lukomsky, the 
chief of staff, however, was negative.  General Lukomsky’s telegram is of crucial 
importance (No. 640) because it not only lays down a careful analysis of the Russian 
politics, the Revolution and the Army’s stance but also illuminates the confused 
mind of Kornilov in Kerensky’s plot.  It is, therefore, necessary to look at his 
telegram at length.   
 
“All persons in touch with military affairs were perfectly aware that, 
in view of the existing state of affairs, when the actual direction of 
internal policy was in the hands of irresponsible public 
organizations, having an enormously deleterious effect on the Army, 
it would be impossible to resurrect the latter; on the contrary, the 
Army properly speaking, would cease to exist in two or three 
months.  Russia would then be obliged to conclude a shameful 
separate peace, whose consequences to the country would be terrible.  
The government took half measures, which, changing nothing, 
merely prolonged the agony, and, in saving the Revolution, did not 
save Russia.  At the same time, the preservation of the benefits of the 
Revolution depended solely on the salvation of Russia, for which 
purpose the first step must be the establishment of a really strong 
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Government and the reform of the home Front.  General Kornilov 
drew up a series of demands, the execution of which has been 
delayed.  In these circumstances, General Kornilov, actuated by no 
motives of personal gain or aggrandizement, and supported by the 
clearly-expressed will of the entire right-thinking sections of the 
Army and the Civil community, who demanded the speedy 
establishment of a strong Government for the saving of their native 
land, and of the benefits of the Revolution, considered more severe 
measures requisite which would secure the reestablishment of order 
in the country. 
The arrival of Savinkov and Lvov, who in your name made General 
Kornilov similar proposals, only brought General Kornilov to a 
speedy decision.  In accordance with your suggestions, he issued his 
final orders, which it is now too late to repeal. 
Your telegram of to-day shows that you have now altered your 
previous decision, communicated in your name by Savinkov and 
Lvov.  Conscience demands from me, desiring only the good of the 
Motherland, to declare to you absolutely that it is now impossible to 
stop what was commenced with your approval; this will lead but to 
civil war, the final dissolution of the Army, and a shameful separate 
peace, as a consequence of which the conquests of Revolution will 
certainly not be secured to us. 
In the interests of the salvation of Russia you must work with 
General Kornilov, and not dismiss him.  The dismissal of General 
Kornilov will bring upon Russia as yet unheard of horrors.  
Personally, I decline to accept any responsibility for the Army, even 
though it be for a short period, and do not consider it possible to take 
over the command from General Kornilov, as this would occasion an 
outburst in the Army which would cause Russia to perish.”178  
          
2.2.2. The Kornilov Mutiny 
Tremendously angered by Kerensky’s disloyalty, Kornilov appointed General 
Krymov as commander of the Savage Division, and ordered his soldiers to march on 
Petrograd with the sole intention of crushing the suspected Bolshevik uprising.  One 
last step came from Savinkov to save the country from the devastation caused by a 
monumental and tragic misunderstanding.  Savinkov communicated with Kornilov 
and learned the details of his contact with Lvov.  Kornilov told Savinkov that all his 
actions were in accordance with the instructions of the Government as conveyed by 
Savinkov and continued, “deeply convinced that the (dismissal) decision, entirely 
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unexpected to me, had been taken under pressure of the Soviet of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Deputies…I firmly declare…that I will not leave my post.”179 Striving to 
mend the breach between the two camps, Savinkov hurried to the Premier’s office to 
offer him a last rapprochement with his commander-in-chief, yet it was too late. 
A press communiqué was already released, under the signature of Kerensky, 
to defend the country from certain circles that had the purpose of “establishing a 
political system inimical to the conquests of the Revolution.”180  The following text 
is Kerensky’s message to the Russian people, which deserves attention for it not only 
reveals Kerensky’s hysterical approach to the general, but also constitutes the final 
source of disagreement that triggered the Kornilov movement,  
“On August 26, General Kornilov sent to me the member of the State 
Duma Vladimir Nikolayevich Lvov, with a demand for the surrender 
by the Provisional Government of the whole plenitude of Civil and 
Military authority, with a view to his forming, at his personal 
discretion, a NEW GOVERNMENT for administering the country.  The 
authenticity of Deputy Lvov’s authorization to make such a proposal 
to me was subsequently confirmed by General Kornilov in his 
conversation with me by direct wire.  Perceiving in the presentation 
of such demands, addressed to the Provisional Government in my 
person, a desire of some circles of Russian society to take advantage 
of the grave condition of the State for the purpose of establishing in 
the country a state of authority in contradiction to the conquests of 
the Revolution, the Provisional Government has found it 
indispensable: 
To authorize me, for the salvation of OUR country, of liberty, and of 
Republican order, to take prompt and resolute measures for the 
purpose of uprooting any attempt to encroach upon the Supreme 
Authority in the State and upon the rights which the citizens have 
conquered by the Revolution… 
At the same time I order herewith: 
I. General Kornilov to surrender the post of Commander-in-Chief to 
General Klembovsky, the Commander-in-Chief over the armies of 
the Northern Front which bar the way to Petrograd; and General 
Klembovsky to enter temporarily upon the post of Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief, while remaining at Pskov. 
II. To declare the city and district of Petrograd under martial law, 
extending to it the regulations for the localities declared under 
Martial Law… 
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I call upon all the citizens to preserve complete tranquility and to 
maintain order, which is so indispensable for the salvation of the 
country.  I call upon all the ranks of the army and navy to carry on 
with calmness and self-abnegation their duty of defending the 
country against external enemy. 
A.F. KERENSKY the 27th day of August 1917”181   
 
Having read Kerensky’s list of accusations, Kornilov’s rage and hatred 
reached an uncontrollable level; notwithstanding the Premier’s insulting language, 
Kornilov was mostly tempered by the fact that Kerensky touched his patriotic nerve.  
The publication of Kerensky’s letter marked not only the deep dismay of Kornilov, 
but also his irreconcilable breakup with the Provisional Government.  He wired a 
counter- message to all front commanders, who gave Kornilov moral support, yet did 
not join him due to the ambiguity of the situation provoked by Kerensky’s message.  
The proclamation of Kornilov was wired the same day, shortly after the Premier’s 
communiqué. 
“The Premier’s telegram…is in its first portion a lie throughout: it 
was not I who sent Deputy Vladimir Lvov to the Provisional 
Government, but he came to me as the Premier’s envoy.  Deputy 
Alexis Aladin is a witness to this. 
           A great provocation has thus taken place, which jeopardizes 
the fate of the FATHERLAND. 
 People of Russia! 
 Our great country is dying.  The hour of its end is near.  
Being compelled to come forward in the open, I, General Kornilov, 
declare that, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority of the 
Soviets, the Provisional government is acting in complete accord 
with the plans of the German General Staff, at the time when enemy 
troops are landing on Riga coast; it is killing the army and shaking 
the foundations of the country… 
 …I, General Kornilov, the son of a Cossack peasant, declare 
to all and sundry that I want nothing for my own person, except the 
preservation of a Great Russia, and I swear to carry over the people, 
by means of a victory over the enemy, to the Constituent Assembly 
at which it will decide its own fate and choose the order of its new 
State life… 
 Russian people, the life of your country is in your hands! 
GENERAL KORNILOV The 27th day of August 1917”182 
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The proclamation indicated Kerensky’s accusations provoked Kornilov to 
rebellion and that Kerensky exacerbated rather than healed the breach.  
Nevertheless, Kornilov’s call for salvation did not receive considerable support 
neither from the generals nor from conservative and liberal circles, a majority of 
which asserted their allegiance to his program at the Moscow Conference only a few 
days earlier.  Kerensky’s blatant distortion of the background of the crisis is also 
manifest in the fact that the Generals refused to follow Kornilov – “an additional 
proof that they had not been involved in any conspiracy with him.”183               
Furthermore, Krymov, who was advancing toward the capital in line with his 
duties, halted the Savage division on receiving the following message from 
Kerensky.  On August 29, Kerensky wired new orders to Krymov and said “In 
Petrograd complete calm.  No disturbances (vystupleniia) expected.  There is no need 
for your corps.  The Provisional Government commands you, on your personal 
responsibility, to stop the advance on Petrograd, ordered by the removed 
Commander-in-Chief, and direct corps not to Petrograd but to its operational 
destination in Narva.”184 As Pipes suggests, “the message makes sense only if 
Kerensky assumed that Krymov was advancing to Petrograd to quell Bolshevik 
disturbances.”185 “The promise, however, was never redeemed.  By Wednesday 
(September 5) it had become clear that the coup was going to fail…Kornilov, a man 
of strong will and great courage, was under the influence of two doubtful individuals, 
his secretary Zavoiko and a member of the First Duma, Aladin.”186 Fraternization 
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took place between the troops advancing on Petrograd and those sent out to meet 
them.  
Although Petrograd was weak against the advance of Kornilov’s army, not a 
single drop of blood was shed; perhaps due to Kornilov’s neglecting his troops’ 
apathy and the willingness of the Soviets to crush Kornilov no less than their desire 
for revolution.  One might even claim that without the aid of the Soviets, Kerensky 
would have been desperate.  Kerensky, however, believes that “The Kornilov 
movement was bloodlessly crushed at the very first moment, only thanks to the 
enthusiasm and the unity of the whole country, which had rallied to the national 
democratic authority.  This unity embraced immeasurably wider strata of the 
population than Soviet circles at that time.”187 M.B. Bruyevich later wrote: “I did not 
expect the Kornilov revolt to succeed; on the contrary, I was sure that it would fail.  I 
was well aware that Kornilov could count on but a handful of officers, for he could 
naturally expect no support from the soldiers.  One had to be a witless scatterbrain 
like Kornilov to believe in the possibility of conquering revolutionary Russia with 
the aid of only two or three divisions of cavalrymen demoralized by a long period of 
inactivity and sated with fleshpots of life in the rear.”188 
Upon his arrival in Petrograd, Krymov met with Kerensky in the Alexander 
III study.  A long an intense argument took place between Krymov and Kerensky, 
followed by Krymov’s suicide.  The next day, Mikhail Alexeyev reluctantly agreed 
to take up the reins as Commander-in-Chief, “the post from which Kerensky had so 
ignominiously sacked him in June.”189 Alexeyev put Kornilov under house arrest in 
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the Bykhov Fortress, where he was allowed to keep his red-cloaked bodyguards.190  
Within a week Alexeyev resigned with the following explanation: “I can state with 
horror that we have no army…It cannot continue like this…Kornilov and those 
arrested with him are not adventurers; these are people who sincerely love their 
country”.191  
Even though the well-known Kornilov affair was checked within a few days, 
the panic concerning counter-revolution and the growth of suspicious attitudes 
towards the Provisional Government made it easy for the Bolsheviks to take 
advantage of the turmoil.  Lenin, during the hot days of the affair, told his comrades 
that; “We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, even as Kerensky’s troops do, 
but we do not support Kerensky.  On the contrary, we expose his weakness…we 
shall not overthrow Kerensky right now, we shall approach the task of struggling 
against him in a different way, namely we shall point out to the people the weakness 
and vacillation of Kerensky.”192  It seems obvious that Lenin was aware that he had 
found a precious opportunity to initiate his assault on the remaining powers that 
opposed him.  Kerensky was now “completely in the hands of the maximalists and 
the Bolsheviks” wrote Zinaida Gippius, “The ball is over.  They haven’t raised their 
heads yet.  They sit.  Tomorrow, of course, they will get on their feet.”193        
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
3. THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM194 
 
3.1. The Impact of the Kornilov Affair on Russian Politics 
 
  
In 1934 Kerensky wrote: “In the autumn of 1917, in Russia, the question 
which is now foremost in the mind of all Europe was formulated for the first time: 
Democracy or Dictatorship? Lenin in Russia was not the product of any un-European 
qualities of the Russian people, but the direct consequence of the War (WWI) which 
has affected the psychology of the masses in the same way throughout Europe.”195   
Indeed, a long-accepted assumption has been that the Kornilov affair brought Lenin 
back into the mainstream of Russia’s revolutionary life.  Having read the Petrograd 
press, which was available in Finland, Lenin wrote a letter to the central committee: 
“Kornilov’s revolt is quite unexpected at such a moment and in such a form- it is 
really an unlikely sharp turn of events.”196  
As Norman Saul argues, “The Kornilov affair is important, then, as a catalyst 
upon Lenin, who began to search intensely for answers to certain questions.”197  
Despite different interpretations, most accounts of the Russian Revolution have been 
in complete agreement that the Kornilov Affair was one of the turning points in the 
course of the Revolution.  Katkov and Chamberlin, for instance, both view the Affair 
as the major cause of the Provisional Government’s downfall – although, for Katkov 
there was no Kornilov Plot to stage a coup, but rather there was a confusion created 
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by Kerensky’s agent provocateurs, whereas the latter believes that Kornilov was a 
self appointed counter-revolutionary, who eventually damaged the Provisional 
Government.  Yet, while denying mutiny, conspiracy, and treachery on Kornilov’s 
part, Katkov argues that “Kornilov intended to suppress the soviets and force a 
reorganization of the Provisional Government, and he talked at length about a 
collective dictatorship, that indeed Kornilov had a plan to overthrow the 
government.”198   
Another contemporary Russian historian, Richard Pipes, who has written 
extensively on the Revolution of 1917, suggests that the Kornilov revolt resulted 
from Kerensky’s conviction that the army was likely to ‘breed a counter 
revolutionary Napoleon.’  E.H. Carr, on the contrary, takes a Western pro-Bolshevik 
stance and tries to justify Kerensky’s fear of a military coup from the right- the 
Kornilov mutiny.  Orlando Figes sides with Katkov and argues that Kornilov was far 
from plotting a coup and that the alleged mutiny was an ‘enduring myth of the 
Russian Revolution.’  
Michael Smith, in his recent article on the ‘Musavat Mutiny,’ emphasizes 
another aspect of the ‘Kornilov Affair.’ Smith argues that in Bolshevik propaganda 
as well as in the later historiography, the ‘Kornilov Mutiny’ was of a piece with the 
‘Musavat Mutiny’ of March 1918.199  The connecting link was the Savage Division.  
In Smith’s satirical language,    
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“It (The Savage Division) had blindly served Kornilov’s notorious 
putsch attempt the year before.  Now it provoked the armed uprising 
or mutiny of Musavat Forces against legitimate Soviet power.  In the 
Bolshevik lore, the conflict brought 20,000 fighters to the streets of 
Baku, evenly matched between the 10,000 Russian and Armenian 
troops of the Baku Soviet and the 10,000 Muslim ‘troops’ of the 
Savage Division.  This was an all-out ‘civil war.’  The legitimate 
authorities representing Soviet power, intent on breaking out of the 
‘circle’ of counter-revolution surrounding it, fought the good fight 
against the illegitimate rebels under the direction of the Musavat, 
intent on raising Baku as the capital of a renegade country 
(Azerbaijan) and uniting with the advancing Anatolian Turks.  This 
was a civil war that, quite by coincidence in the Soviet version, also 
turned into the murderous ‘national war’ between Dashnak and 
Muslim forces between 1 and 3 April.  The Bolsheviks freely 
admitted their inability to prevent the anti-Muslim pogroms that 
were perpetrated by renegade Dashnak troops and that spread to 
nearby cities and villages.”200   
 
In brief, most accounts of the Kornilov Affair argue that the clash between 
Kornilov and Kerensky fatally damaged the latter’s authority, as well as his 
relationship with conservative and liberal circles without reinforcing his socialist 
support.  The main beneficiaries of the Kornilov Affair were, thus, the Bolsheviks; as 
Abraham Ascher puts it, “The Kornilov rebellion was essentially a test of strength 
between Kornilov and Kerensky; the victor, strange as it may sound, was 
Lenin…Indeed, the Bolshevik strategy was to help crush the Generalissimo and then 
take advantage of the ensuing chaos”201 Ascher is highly critical of Kornilov’s role 
rather than Kerensky’s.  Ascher is almost certain that Kornilov rebelled against the 
Provisional Government with the pretext that there would be a Bolshevik uprising 
supposedly scheduled for September 10th.  Hence he argues that Kerensky acted 
properly in dismissing Kornilov.  Leonid Strakhovsky, however, challenged Ascher’s 
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240  
 
200 Michael G. Smith ‘Anatomy of a Rumour: Murder Scandal, the Musavat Party and Narratives of 
the Russian Revolution in Baku’ Journal of Contemporary History Vol.36, No.2 (Apr., 2001), p. 227 
201Ascher, ‘The Kornilov Affair’…, p.250. 
 74 
interpretation arguing that the real villain of the episode was Kerensky, who by 
deliberately betraying his Commander-in-Chief delivered Russia into the hands of 
the Bolsheviks.  According to Strakhovsky, Kornilov was not a counterrevolutionary; 
rather he was a courageous general, who only believed that Kerensky had fallen 
under the influence of the Soviet thereby requesting Kornilov’s surrender.  A similar 
view was raised in 1970 by Harvey Asher (not to be confused with A. Ascher) who 
tried to prove that when Kornilov refused to surrender, it was obviously “an act of 
insubordination, but certainly not of mutiny or rebellion as Kerensky wanted it to 
appear.”202    
Kerensky’s wife, on the other hand, wrote that the prestige of Kerensky and 
the Provisional Government was completely destroyed by the Kornilov Affair, and 
that he was left almost without any supporters.203  “Beyond the corridors of the 
Winter Palace” wrote Figes, “all Kerensky’s decrees were ignored.  There was a 
vacuum of power; and it was now only a question of who would dare to fill it.”204 
Although the Bolsheviks often claimed that the course of the October Revolution of 
1917 had already been defined before the Kornilov Affair, the Generalissimo’s 
insurrection and Kerensky’s exposed weakness gave it a great momentum.  In fact, 
Kerensky already lost ground when he failed to carry out punitive actions against the 
Bolsheviks for the July Days - a timidity, which mostly derived from the fact that 
Kerensky did not dare to risk the Soviet’s support.  Reprieved by the crisis following 
the Kornilov Affair, the Bolsheviks labored “stubbornly and without letup”.205 On 
15th September 1917, Louis de Robien wrote in his memoirs that, 
“The conflict between Kornilov and Kerensky is going to take a back 
seat, because a far more dangerous struggle is in the preparation 
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between the government, supported by all those who want relative 
order, and the Soviets, who have realized the extent of their strength 
as a result of this venture, and who are preaching to their tovariches 
to revolt against all authority.”206 
 
The waning popularity of Kerensky and the Provisional Government in the 
aftermath of the Kornilov Affair ruined the last hopes for amelioration in Russia, 
both in the rear and at the front.  George Katkov, in his book on the Kornilov Affair, 
argues that the disastrous impact of the Kornilov affair was most apparent in the 
Russian army.  The counter-accusations of Kornilov and Kerensky was confusing 
and demoralizing the troops; “The susceptibility of the soldiers to such (Bolshevik) 
propaganda translated into behavior of an anarchical nature, including the arbitrary 
lynching of officers.” 207 Furthermore, the Bolshevik newspapers were publishing 
instances of these killings.  On September 2 1917, for example, the Bolshevik paper 
Izvestia wrote: “at first three generals and a colonel, who were arrested earlier, on 
charges of supporting Kornilov, were dragged out of the guardhouse by the crowd, 
thrown off the bridge and killed in the water.”208 The Kornilov Affair left the 
supreme command with a diminishing authority that led to Kerensky’s demise.  As 
Victor Shklovsky209 recalled:  
“The Russian army was ruptured even before the Revolution.  
Revolution, the Russian Revolution, with the ‘maximalism of 
democratism’ by the Provisional Government, freed the army from 
all constraints.  There were no laws left in the army – not even rules.  
But there was a complement of trained men, capable of sacrifice, 
capable of holding the trenches.  Even without constraints, a short 
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war was possible – a blitzkrieg…we knew that what lay in front of 
us was not an army, but a hash – distinctly worse than our 16th Corps 
and a good deal more cowardly; but unfortunately the Germans did, 
however approximately, follow orders.”210       
     
Marc Ferro, on the other hand, suggests “the February Revolution had broken 
out in the streets and was the handiwork of all, but the part played by the soldiers had 
been all-important – as it was in April and again in June, September, and October.  
But now not only the troops at the rear were involved; those at the front had also 
joined in the movement and, in the face of the Germans, had thrown into question 
one of the oldest traditions – army discipline.”211 He further argues that Kerensky’s 
fear of breaking with the General Staff, his deep-seated hostility to the Soviets, his 
preference for negotiations at all costs, and his delusion that he could reconcile the 
irreconcilable were all factors that induced Kerensky to deal gently with Kornilov in 
their duel.  This attitude had the most drastic results.  “It alienated for good the 
sympathy of those who had continued to obey the rules of any institutions yet 
functioning” wrote Ferro after presenting an inquiry concerning several battalions of 
the Russian Army at the Eastern Front.212   
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212 1. What is the general situation? (Fairly Good) 
2. Fighting proficiency?  (Fairly Good) 
3. Cases of refusal to obey orders? (Fluctuating) 
4. Cases of failure to obey? (Frequent but without downright refusal) 
5. Relations with civilian population? (Often difficult)  
6. Influence of Political Committees? (Often adjudged ‘good’ by the Staff) 
7. Influence of reinforcements? (Often ‘bad’) 
8. Influence of Political Parties? (Often ‘weak’) 
9. Is military justice resorted to? (Rarely) 
10. Desertions? (Not many) 
 
Number of Bolshevik Groups  July September November 
 Southwestern Front  44 108  135 
 Rumanian Front    30 65  145 
Source: Ibid, p.508 
 
 77 
Observing the disastrous September, Buchanan wrote, “it (Kornilov Affair) 
deprived officers of the little authority which they previously possessed, while it had 
restored the influence of the Soviet.  The latter had passed resolutions abolishing the 
death penalty, declaring all existing secret treaties invalid, and demanding the 
immediate conclusion of a universal democratic peace.”213  Furthermore, the reaction 
against the Kornilovites grew to an even greater extent than the anti-Bolshevik 
phobia during the July days.  “Now it was the monarchists …anyone with the faintest 
hue of the Tsarist past, who was hunted off the streets” wrote Moorehead, “but it was 
upon the inner political structure of the socialist movement that the Kornilov fiasco 
had its really significant effect.”214  
A different alignment was being formed among the various socialist groups 
throughout September; the Mensheviks had gradually became confined to the 
government cadres and the skilled workers to the trade-unions, while the Socialist-
Revolutionaries were becoming “rather less of a peasant party than they were 
before.”215 Similarly, in his personal records of the Russian Revolution, Sukhanov 
wrote: 
“Even before the Kornilov mutiny, before the Fall of Riga and after 
the Moscow Conference, the entire bourgeois press had sounded the 
alarm about the Bolshevik peril, in connection with ‘reliable reports’ 
about forthcoming ‘demonstrations’ by the Bolsheviks… The 
Kornilov incident, however, not only accelerated the Bolshevization 
of the Soviets and the worker-peasant masses, but was also sharply 
reflected in the current policies of Lenin’s Soviet opponents.  The 
Mensheviks and the SRs who ruled in the Central Ex. Com. were 
just as far from Bolshevism as before; but they too had shifted their 
positions and swung Left.” 216 
 
The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, began to control the bulk of society, who 
were “stirred and shaken up by the recent events”; in Moorehead’s words, “it was left 
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to the Bolsheviks to exploit the rest of the population, the city workers, the soldiers, 
the vast illiterate hordes who had nothing much to lose and a great deal to gain from 
the break up of the established order.”217 Indeed, throughout September 1917, the 
workers and soldiers of the Petrograd Soviet began turning to the Bolsheviks in 
remarkable numbers.218  On September 12, for instance, when the tension between 
the Kornilovites and the Soviets was at its height, the impact of the Kornilov Affair 
on the left became crystal clear at the Petrograd Soviet meeting;   
“by 279 votes to 115 the Petrograd Soviet passed a Bolshevik 
resolution which demanded that Russia should be declared a 
republic, that the government should be made up entirely of 
socialists, that the land should be given to the peasant Soviets, that 
the workers should control industry, that the secret peace treaties 
should be annulled, and that peace should be concluded at once – in 
short the whole Bolshevik programme.” 219            
  
Trotsky became the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet; he later recalled in his 
autobiography that “While handing over the chairmanship, Tsereteli asked me how 
we would be able to retain our authority.  The implication was that they gave us three 
months at most.  They were terribly mistaken.  We were making solid steps towards 
authority.”220  It was the first apparent Bolshevik victory, upon which Lenin called 
upon his comrades to put every possible pressure on Kerensky, compelling him to 
give more concessions.  An all-out Bolshevization was taking place in Russia, from 
every small district to major towns; on September 18, the Moscow Soviet voted for 
the Bolshevik Nogin as its chairman.  On September 27, Lenin wrote: 
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“Without deliberately closing one’s eyes, one cannot fail to see that 
after the Kornilov affair Kerensky’s government is leaving 
everything as before, that in fact it is bringing back the Kornilov 
affair. The appointment of Alexeev, the peace with the 
Klembovskys, Gagarins, Bagrations and other Kornilov men, and 
leniency in the treatment of Kornilov and Kaledin all very clearly 
prove that Kerensky is in fact bringing back the Kornilov affair.  
There is no middle course.  This has been shown by experience. 
Either all power goes to the Soviets and the army is made fully 
democratic, or another Kornilov affair occurs.”221 
 
 Witnessing the rapid Bolshevization following the Kornilov Affair, the 
Mensheviks and the SRs made one last attempt to revive the government and to 
contain the growing tide of revolution; they decided to summon the socialist party 
groups, the zemstvos, industrialists, and soldiers’ deputies in an All-Russia 
Democratic Conference in mid-September.  The Central Committee of the 
Bolsheviks immediately called a party conference, where Trotsky proposed the 
slogan of boycotting the Democratic Conference and the Pre-Parliament.  His 
proposal was met with intense opposition by some delegates led by Kamenev and 
Riazanov, while the rest, led by Lenin, welcomed it.222  
The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, having divided in two 
opposing camps concerning Trotsky’s proposal, submitted the question to the 
decision of the conference.  Actually, the question in concern was more related with 
the consistency of the traditional ideology of the party; in Trotsky’s words, “The 
question was whether the party should accommodate its tasks to the development of 
a bourgeois republic, or should really set itself the goal of conquering the power…In 
reality the quarrel revived the April disagreements and initiated the disagreements of 
October.”223  The party conference rejected the slogan of boycott by a majority of 77 
votes against 50; Riazanov announced that the Bolshevik representatives would be 
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sent to the Democratic Conference with the intention of “in this new fortress of 
compromisism to expose all attempts at a new coalition with the bourgeoisie.”224  In 
response to Riazanov’s announcement Lenin wrote:  
"We must boycott the Pre-Parliament. We must go out into the 
soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants’ deputies, go out into the 
trade unions, go out in general to the masses. We must summon 
them to the struggle. We must give them a correct and clear slogan: 
To drive out the Bonapartist gang of Kerensky with its fake Pre-
Parliament. . The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries even after 
the Kornilov events refused to accept our offer of compromise. . . 
.Ruthless struggle against them! Ruthless expulsion of them from all 
revolutionary organizations! . . . Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, 
Comrade Trotsky! Boycottism was defeated in the faction of the 
Bolsheviks who attended the Democratic Conference. Long live the 
boycott!"225 
 
Indeed, the conference was a fiasco from its very outset; In Sukhanov’s 
words, “It (the Conference) proceeded on is futile, tiresome business: a debate on 
whether we should have a Coalition or a purely democratic Government…We were 
back in the old post-July, pre-Kornilov situation.  A fourth irresponsible Coalition 
was revived, which once again confirmed the formal dictatorship of the 
bourgeoisie…, the whole situation was more absurd and intolerable than before.  
There was no state power and no State.”226  The only notable outcome of the 
conference was that, while pending the elections for the Constituent Assembly, the 
parties reached a consensus on the establishment of a temporary parliamentary body 
under the name of the ‘Pre-Parliament227’, and fixed the opening date of this new 
political body for October 20.228  Despite the initial Bolshevik debates on boycotting 
the conference, Trotsky later asked permission to make an emergency statement and 
was granted ten minutes.  In his speech, Trotsky said that,  
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“The propertied classes are openly steering a course for the bony 
hand of hunger, which is expected to strangle the revolution and the 
Constituent Assembly first of all.  Nor is their foreign policy any less 
criminal.  After forty months of war the capital is threatened by 
mortal danger.  In response to this a plan had been put forward for 
the transfer of the government to Moscow.  The idea of surrendering 
the revolutionary capital to German troops does not arouse the 
slightest indignation among the bourgeois classes; on the contrary it 
is accepted as a natural link in the general policy that is supposed to 
help them in their counter-revolutionary conspiracy…We the 
Bolshevik faction of the Social-Democratic party, declare that, with 
this government of national treachery we have nothing in 
common…We refuse to shield it either directly or indirectly for a 
single day…Petrograd is in danger, the revolution is in danger, the 
nation is in danger.  The government is intensifying that 
danger…Only the nation can save itself and the country…Long live 
the Constituent Assembly”229 
 
Trotsky’s message is crucial because it not only divided the socialist parties at the 
Democratic Conference by the sheer commanding effect of its rhetoric, but it also 
led the Bolsheviks to rise from their seats and walk out of the conference.   In this 
sense, his speech might be considered as a declaration of the imminent revolution; 
the Bolsheviks will have nothing more to do with parliaments and conferences.  
In short, the Bolsheviks, who were simply trying to gain time to establish a 
proper army before the Kornilov affair, found themselves seeking ways to seize the 
power – the power, which snatched away in July.  As studied above, in order to 
suppress Kornilov, Kerensky called for help from the Soviet, which approved, on a 
Menshevik motion, the creation of a ‘Committee to Fight the Counterrevolution’.  
Yet, since the Bolshevik Military Organization was the only armed force that the 
Soviet could invoke, the Bolshevik forces were placed as the Soviet’s military 
contingent; thus, as Pipes argues, “yesterday’s arsonists became today’s 
firefighters.”230  Lenin and Zinoviev231, in Sukhanov’s words, “taking advantage of 
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their leisure, began deepening their current programme and tactics – tactics of 
finished Jacobinism and a programme of general explosion, as an example to 
proletarian Europe.”232 To this end, on September 30, Lenin wrote a message from 
his hiding in Finland, and urged the Central Committee to seize power.  In Lenin’s 
words,  
“The crisis is here…It is criminal to delay…Not only Russia but all 
Europe was on the edge of revolution. They must strike at three 
places: in Petrograd, in Moscow, and in the Baltic Fleet.  They must 
have plans to assault the Winter Palace, to seize the bridges across 
the Neva, to isolate the capital from the hinterland.  Why won’t the 
Central Committee act? Can’t they see that the party has power NOW 
and that there is no point in waiting for the all-Russian Congress of 
Soviets in November?”233 
      
 
3.2. The Bolsheviks Seize Power 
As Kerensky later recalled in his Memoirs, Before World War I there had 
been no doubt about the meaning of the two words ‘revolution’ and ‘counter-
revolution’.  
 “‘Revolution’ meant the forceful overthrow by the people of a state 
system… ‘Counter-revolution’ meant the restoration by force of the 
political system existing prior to the Revolution.  Revolution was 
supposed to break out spontaneously, to have its roots deep among 
the people, and to bring about the establishment of democracy. 
Counter-revolution was usually the work of a particular group 
among the ruling classes, and was always followed by a period of 
‘reaction’… (But) After World War I, in which millions of people 
throughout Europe were embroiled in a political maelstrom, any 
movement on a mass scale came to be termed a ‘revolution’; no 
matter what aims its leaders were pursuing…there was a vast 
difference from the point of view of the people’s interests and the 
future of Russia, between the Kornilov movement and Lenin’s 
movement, which the Kornilov movement had revived.” 234  
  
Lenin’s advocacy of an armed uprising and seizure of power, as envisaged in his 
April Thesis, was a passionate plan but the time he proposed for the insurrection did 
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not seem entirely convincing to his fellow party members.  After all, the Bolsheviks 
gained an upper-hand in the Soviet, thus, most party members were waiting for the 
Soviet to seize power, which would at least be a quasi-legal, peaceful transfer of 
power.  On October 9, 1917 Lenin came to Petrograd in disguise and the next day he 
attended the meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee, where he strongly 
condemned the party members for ignoring his previous messages and of letting slip 
this precious moment – “We shall ruin the revolution” he said.235  His appearance at 
the meeting had a profound impact on the members; by a majority of 10 votes 
(Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kolontai, Bubnov, 
Sokolnikov, Lomov) to 2 (Kamenev and Zinoviev) the Central Committee passed a 
resolution to prepare for the armed uprising and establish a political bureau to carry 
out the commands.  The politburo, which was “the first germ of what later became a 
permanent institution”, consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Trotsky, 
Sokolnikov, and Bubnov.236 
In terms of solidarity among the politburo members, it is crucial to note here 
that the two delegates, Kamenev and Zinoviev, who voted against Lenin’s immediate 
insurrection proposal, were Lenin’s old comrades.  These two men considered a 
Bolshevik coup as an irresponsible act, and argued that it would be impossible to 
hold power without the aid of the Soviet.  To this end, they circulated protest letters 
to major Bolshevik organizations, including Maxim Gorky’s Novaya Zhizn, and 
published a list of their arguments; Lenin was inevitably frustrated not only because 
these letters opposed his advocacy of the second stage of the Revolution, but also 
because the forewarning of an imminent Bolshevik coup.  237  Nonetheless, this 
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publicity helped, rather than hindered Lenin’s cause; under these circumstances, now 
it would be fatal for the Bolsheviks not to act and they would be arrested.  Of course, 
Kerensky’s ineffectiveness was once more manifested in his reluctance to take 
decisive measures against the Soviet and the Bolsheviks after the news of a coup 
d'état had been broken.   
On October 16, restating his case for the immediate seizure of power, Lenin 
arranged an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee attended by Bolsheviks from 
the Petrograd Soviet party committee, from the Petrograd Soviet military 
organization and from the trade unions and factory committees.238  Lenin found the 
opportunity to put forward his consideration of the party’s position to even greater 
masses: 
“The position is clear.  Either a Kornilov dictatorship or a 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry.  
We cannot be guided by the mood of the masses: that is changeable 
and unaccountable.  We must be guided by an objective analysis and 
estimate of the revolution.  The masses have given their confidence 
to the Bolsheviks and ask from them not words but deeds.”239  
  
The discussions showed that although Lenin attracted a majority of the 
Central Committee members on his side, the concerns of Kamenev and Zinoviev 
were still shared by large groups.  In order to liquidate the opposition, reaffirming his 
allegiance to Lenin’s program, Stalin made a speech, wherein he said: “Here are two 
lines: one is headed for the victory of the revolution and leans over Europe: the other 
does not believe in the revolution and counts only on being an opposition.  The 
Petrograd Soviet has already taken its stand on the road to insurrection by refusing to 
sanction the removal of the armies.”240 Hence, the meeting was concluded with a 
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resolution to begin preparations for an armed insurrection.  As Alexander 
Rabinowitch describes it, the initial approach for an insurrection was formed quickly.  
“In the face of these obstacles to organization of an immediate armed 
uprising, the following approach gradually suggested itself: (1) that 
the soviets (because of their stature in the eyes of the workers and 
soldiers), and not the party groups, should be employed for the 
overthrow of the Provisional Government; (2) that for the broadest 
support, any attack on the government should be masked as a 
defensive operation on behalf of the Soviet; (3) thus that action 
should be delayed until a suitable excuse for giving battle presented 
itself; (4) that to undercut potential resistance and to maximize the 
possibility of success, every opportunity should be utilized to subvert 
the authority of the Provisional Government peacefully; and (5) that 
the formal overthrow of the existing government should be linked 
with and legitimized by the decisions of the Second Congress of 
Soviets.”241  
 
“The critical moment was now at hand” wrote E.H. Carr in his account of the 
October Revolution, “being fixed by the decision to strike the blow before the second 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the evening of October 25.”242  Indeed, the 
uprising began on 24 October as scheduled; Trotsky attached the members of the 
Central Committee to the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet 
to control the post, railways and the Provisional Government.  Dzerzhinsky was 
appointed to check the railways, Bubnov for posts and telegraphs, Sverdlov for the 
Provisional Government and Milyutin for the food supply.  The Bolshevik forces 
went into action on early morning of October 25, 1917; the key-points of the city 
were bloodlessly contained, members of the Provisional Government were arrested, 
and the Winter Palace was surrounded, while Kerensky was allowed to escape.243  In 
the afternoon Lenin announced the triumph of the workers’ and peasants’ revolution 
while Trotsky explained that,  
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“What has taken place is an uprising, not a conspiracy. An uprising 
of the masses of the people needs no justification. We have been 
strengthening the revolutionary energy of the workers and soldiers. 
We have been forging, openly, the will of the masses for an uprising. 
Our uprising has won. And now we are being asked to give up our 
victory, to come to an agreement. With whom? You are wretched, 
disunited individuals; you are bankrupts; your part is over. Go to the 
place where you belong from now on the dust-bin of history!”244 
   
Eventually, the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the 
transfer of all power to the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ and Peasants’ 
Deputies.  At 10 a.m. in the morning it declared that, “The Provisional Government 
has been deposed…The cause for which the people have fought, namely, the 
immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of landed proprietorship, 
workers' control over production, and the establishment of Soviet power—this cause 
has been secured.”245  Trotsky’s brilliant strategy of using the Soviet’s military 
branch not only helped legitimize the Bolshevik coup but also hindered the 
resistance in the countryside, thus, enabling the Bolsheviks hold on to power.  The 
Winter Palace fell in the evening of October 25 marking the Bolsheviks’ victory.   
After the Central Executive Committee of the soviets assumed power, the 
governmental authority was transferred to a new Council of People’s Commissars, 
whose all-Bolshevik members list was submitted to the Congress on October 26.246  
Organized armed struggle against the Bolsheviks began very soon after the 
overthrow of the Provisional Government.  Of all the counter-revolutionary forces, 
the White movement lasted the longest, had the most stable administrative structure 
and leadership.  As Peter Kenez puts it “Following their victory, the rule of the 
Bolsheviks remained so insecure that their enemies, however weak, could organize 
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almost with impunity.  Socialist and non-Socialist politicians put together a number 
of abortive schemer.  In the long run, among many domestic enemies of the 
Bolsheviks only the ex-officers of the Imperial Army proved to be dangerous.”247 
Generals Alexeyev and Kornilov, who were among the best-known figures of the 
defunct Imperial Army, initiated the organization.  After Kornilov’s death in April 
1918 General Denikin took charge and led the Volunteer Army in the decisive 
campaigns of 1918 and 1919.  The last leader of the Whites, General Wrangel, 
however, struggled against ‘insurmountable odds in 1920.’248   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The revolution that broke out in Petrograd, in February 1917, was the first of 
the two revolutions, which characterized the most significant years in Russian 
History.  The fall of the Tsar, Nicholas II, brought an end to the 300-year-old 
Romanov Dynasty.  In the aftermath of this revolution emerged the uneasy and often 
conflicting Dual Power between the Petrograd Soldiers’ and Workers’ Deputies and 
the Provisional Government led by Prince Lvov, who was an old Zemstvo man.  As 
briefly portrayed in the first chapter, it would be difficult to argue that the checks and 
balances system between the two bodies were efficient.  Following the April Crisis, 
the increasingly unpopular war-efforts of the Provisional Government had led to the 
spread of local Soviet bodies and the growth of trade unions throughout the country.  
The troublesome relationship between the Soviet and the government reached its 
climax in early June followed by an unsuccessful Bolshevik putsch.  Three days after 
the offensive against the Bolsheviks, Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky, took charge 
of the Provisional Government, imprisoned key Bolshevik leaders such as Trotsky 
and Kamenev, and appointed General Lavr Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief to 
restore the fighting capacity of the Russian Army.   
 Yet, the Premier’s relationship with Kornilov, which was covered in detail 
through the second chapter of this thesis, was much more complicated and in early 
September the final break occurred between the two camps, paving the way for a 
rejuvenation of the Bolsheviks.  The events that took place between the dramatis 
personae, which enabled the Bolsheviks to recover from the July debacle and seize 
power in October, are often referred as ‘The Kornilov Affair’. As Alan Wildman puts 
it,  
 89 
“In the historiography and classical accounts of 1917 the Kornilov 
affair appears sometimes as a pathetic or comic interlude, sometimes 
as the only viable alternative to Bolshevism, sometimes as a bargain 
between Kerensky and Kornilov which broke down because of 
meddling intermediaries or Kerensky’s failure of will, sometimes as 
a straightforward contest between the dichotomized social and 
political forces of the revolution.”249 
 
Different interpretations of the Kornilov Affair, which were studied within the third 
chapter, are to be found in the Russian historiography.  Nevertheless, a majority of 
the historians have a consensus as to the prime importance of the affair on the fall of 
Kerensky’s government and the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.  How, 
then, did Kerensky’s handling of the General jeopardized the Provisional 
Government?   
 Throughout the preparation of this thesis, an investigation of the memoirs of 
Tsarist Generals as well as secondary sources on the history of the Russian 
Revolution revealed the fact that Kerensky’s obsessive fear of a counter-revolution 
from the right and his decision to pursue a campaign against an alleged plot against 
the government headed by Kornilov fatally weakened the Government’s credibility 
in the eyes of both right and left wing circles.  Historical accounts of the Affair as 
well as recent interpretations of the subject, however, turn out to include 
considerably divergent views as to whether Kornilov really planned a coup or 
whether it was just the premier’s misleading imagination.  Such a difference in 
opinions is evident in the works of Richard Pipes, Orlando Figes, Edward H. Carr, 
George Katkov, as well as in the memoirs of old Tsarist generals, such as Brusilov, 
Lukomsky, Denikin and Bruyevich.   
 Despite these divergent interpretations, there is a clear unanimity among the 
historians over the significance of the course of events that took place between the 
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General and the Premier throughout the summer of 1917.  An examination of 
Russian historiography would reveal the existence of a conspiracy of counter-
revolution, which included the General and the Premier.  Richard Pipes argues, quite 
justly, that the Kornilov Affair resulted from Kerensky’s “sense that the army was 
likely to breed a counter-revolutionary Napoleon” and his determination to 
overthrow the general.250  Likewise, as Figes argues, Kerensky’s major fault was to 
found his political strategy on “straddling left and right” to maintain his central role 
in the government.  It was this same reason behind Kerensky’s fear of alienating the 
support of the Soviet, when he repeatedly avoided committing himself.  Bearing in 
mind Kerensky’s efforts to pacify the left while giving up his earlier promises, it 
becomes clear how Kerensky created tensions with Kornilov, who only desired to 
restore order and discipline in the Russian Army.   
 Having considered this point a series of crucial question arises: Had Kerensky 
managed to deal with the crisis between himself and the Generalissimo, would the 
Bolshevik insurrection still have been successful? If Kerensky had fulfilled his 
commitments instead of giving concessions to the left, would the gap between the 
Soviet and the Government have been bridged and the Constituent Assembly been 
summoned as scheduled? Would Russia have had the chance to experience a 
peaceful transition to democracy? While such suggestions would have been possible, 
it should further be borne in mind that the Provisional Government had other serious 
challenges; most importantly, the unpopular war-efforts and inflation.  As portrayed 
by Marc Ferro, Norman Stone and Peter Kenez in their detailed accounts of the 
Russian army, turmoil was inevitable under wartime conditions.  As to the Kornilov 
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Affair, it stands as a turning point in the irreversible course of revolution – a moment 
when the February system stopped.    
 The greatest difficulty that confronts a student, who investigates the Kornilov 
Affair, is that all first-hand accounts of the subject originate from people who were 
involved (directly or indirectly) in it.  It is therefore almost impossible – despite the 
wealth of source materials – to derive a single conclusion out of it.  A prominent 
investigator of the affair, Dr. James D. White, wrote in 1973 that “From all the 
literature on the subject three main interpretations emerge which may be termed: ‘the 
great conspiracy’, ‘the great betrayal’, and ‘the misunderstanding.’”251 As studied in 
the first sub-section of the third chapter, ‘The great conspiracy’ theory was mainly 
supported by Kerensky himself, especially in the numerous books he wrote after the 
Revolution.  The collection of documents, which he edited with Paul Browder, 
further amplified his thesis to some extent.  ‘The Great Betrayal’ theory, on the other 
hand, was basically the pro-Kornilov version, which is based on Kornilov’s 
statement to the Commission.252 It argues that there was no Kornilov plot; on the 
contrary, Kornilov was acting in line with Kerensky’s orders (transmitted through his 
envoy, Lvov.) The memoirs of Sir George Buchanan present the third theory- ‘tragic 
misunderstanding’- which is actually a generous combination of the first two. 
Bearing in mind the various accounts on the Affair, however, one is 
eventually confronted with a number of questions.  It is all the more intriguing, for 
instance, how Krymov committed suicide.  Kornilov’s failure was mostly a result of 
the Savage Division’s disloyalty under Krymov’s command, and this should have 
deeply disappointed  Krymov, who was very close to the General. Nevertheless, it is 
uncertain how he did it.  Kerensky, in The Catastrophe, says that “While under arrest 
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in my office, General Krymov committed suicide with his revolver”253  In Prelude to 
Bolshevism, on the other hand, he claims that “…an hour or two later after Krymov 
left my study he committed suicide.”254 N. Ukraintsev, a member of the Commission 
of Inquiry, wrote an article in 1956 for a New York émigré newspaper Novoe russkoe 
slovo, and asked what should have been asked years ago: Why was the Premier not 
certain about what happened in his own study?255  Another serious question, which 
puzzles the reader, is why Kerensky did not go to Mogiliev to settle his problems 
with Kornilov and decided to send Lvov.  As Ukraintsev puts it “Was he frightened 
of the lamp-posts in Mogiliev, conjured up by the raving of two windbags, Captain 
Rodionov and his ‘old friend’ Lvov?”256  While various interpretations had been 
made by contemporary scholars and by those who witnessed the episode, the 
intriguing affair between the Premier and his C-in-C is likely to remain as an 
‘enduring myth’ of the Russian Revolution. 
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